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The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding
Andrew A. Schwartz*
Abstract
Securities crowdfunding is premised on two core policy goals:
inclusivity and efficiency. First, crowdfunding is conceived as an
inclusive system where all entrepreneurs are given a chance to pitch
their idea to the “crowd.” Second, crowdfunding is supposed to be
an efficient way to channel funds from public investors to promising
startup companies. There is a fundamental tension between these
two policy goals, however. A totally inclusive system would ensure
that platforms list any and every company that wants to
participate. But platforms need to curate and select the companies
they list in order to establish a reputation as a reliable market for
investors. This gatekeeping function aids efficiency, but is exclusive
by its nature. Hence, the tension between inclusive and efficient
crowdfunding.
This Article provides a theoretical and an empirical analysis of
inclusivity versus efficiency in crowdfunding. It also compares the
American crowdfunding system with its counterpart in New
Zealand using original research collected by the author during a
six-month residency in that country. This research reveals that
crowdfunding in New Zealand is much more financially successful
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than in the United States. This Article explains this outperformance
on the basis that New Zealand’s system is focused solely on
efficiency, even at the expense of inclusivity. In the United States,
by contrast, we closed our eyes to the tension between efficiency and
inclusivity and tried to achieve both at the same time. In practice,
and perhaps as could have been expected, this has led to only minor
success on both fronts.
Broadening the analysis out, we see that inclusive
crowdfunding is a luxury that only certain countries can manage,
depending on their existing systems for entrepreneurial finance.
The United States has a huge and sophisticated venture capital
industry and thus can afford to sacrifice some efficiency in our
crowdfunding system in order to advance inclusivity. But New
Zealand has long had very little venture capital investment and
hence a real need to develop crowdfunding as an effective new
means for efficiently channeling capital to the country’s startup
companies. The need to consciously trade off inclusivity and
efficiency is an important lesson from the present research.
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I. Introduction
Securities crowdfunding—a new form of Internet-based public
stock market modelled on Kickstarter and other reward
crowdfunding websites1—has a contradiction at its core. On the
one hand, crowdfunding seeks to create an inclusive system where
any and all entrepreneurs, regardless of who they know or where
they are from, are invited to pitch their company directly to “the
crowd” (the broad public).2 On the other, crowdfunding is supposed
to be an efficient system where capital-starved startups and small
businesses can get the funding they need to grow, create jobs, and
contribute to the economy.3
These policy goals are in tension. A totally inclusive system
would impose a legal requirement on crowdfunding platforms—
websites that act like online stock exchanges—to include any and
every company that wants to list on their site.4 Reward
1. See infra Part II.B (detailing the parallels between securities
crowdfunding and ordinary crowdfunding).
2. Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661,
672 [hereinafter Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding].
3. See id. at 666 (observing that the “rich academic literature” on securities
crowdfunding “largely focuses on questions of efficiency and efficacy”).
4. See id. at 671 (“An inclusive environment, broadly defined as one in
which ‘all people feel valued and respected and have access to the same
opportunities,’ can generate positive effects.”).
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crowdfunding generally follows this model: Kickstarter does not
screen, curate, or vet the projects before presenting them to the
crowd; anyone with an idea can take a shot.5
But securities crowdfunding platforms have a clear business
need to exclude at least some of the companies who seek to
participate, in order to establish a reputation as a reliable place for
people to invest.6 Imagine a law that required the New York Stock
Exchange to list on its Big Board any company that asked! Just as
with traditional securities markets, some sort of gatekeeping
function for the platform seems vital for the system to function
effectively—or maybe at all.7 Yet gatekeeping necessarily implies
including some companies and excluding others, a direct affront to
the goal of inclusivity and unmediated access to the crowd.8 Hence
the tension between inclusivity and efficiency in securities
crowdfunding.9
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
struggled to resolve this tension from the earliest days. The initial
regulations, proposed by the SEC in 2013, adopted a radical
version of inclusivity that would have required online
crowdfunding platforms to list any company that asked to be
included, regardless of the platform’s view of its prospects or the
price of the securities.10 Public commenters, however, pilloried that

5. See Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/
faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (answering basic questions
about Kickstarter and its policies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
6. Infra notes 275–278 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the integral role of gatekeepers, or lack
thereof, in the success of crowdfunding operations).
8. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 662 (“Inclusivity
is core to the nature of crowdfunding as a distinct form of capital raising.”).
9. The present work is focused solely on inclusivity as it applies to
entrepreneurs. Inclusivity as it applies to investors, while beyond the scope of the
current work, is apparent from the fact that the general public is invited to
participate on the investor side. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital
Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 611 (2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Digital
Shareholder] (“Once crowdfunding begins, anybody with a startup will be able to
go online and offer a piece of the action to the American people. And the
community of investors . . . will be inclusive and diverse as well.”).
10. See infra Part II.D (analyzing the SEC’s proposed rule for inclusion of
companies on its site listings).
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proposal as being overly harmful to efficiency.11 In the end, the
SEC relented, and the final version of its crowdfunding regulations
(operative since 2016) do allow platforms to pick and choose which
companies to list on their sites.12 This episode, described in Part
II.D below, neatly encapsulates crowdfunding’s inherent tension
between efficiency and inclusivity.
Securities crowdfunding, while born in the United States, has
become a worldwide phenomenon,13 with New Zealand leading the
charge.14 As Part III describes, that country was one of the earliest
foreign jurisdictions with a functioning legal regime for
crowdfunding, having launched its equity crowdfunding market in
2014,15 two years ahead of the United States.16 Since then, New
Zealand has become an international leader in the field, making it
an ideal destination for an academic study of this emerging area
in securities regulation.17
The author accordingly spent the first half of 2017 on the
ground in New Zealand to study its crowdfunding law and
11. See infra Part II.D (highlighting the effect of public comments on the
final rule).
12. See infra Part II.D (discussing the SEC’s final rule regarding company
listings on platforms).
13. See KIM WALES, PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A
GUIDE TO THE NEW CAPITAL MARKETS FOR JOB CREATORS, INVESTORS, AND
ENTREPRENEURS 21–54 (2018) (describing securities crowdfunding laws recently
enacted in dozens of nations around the world).
14. See infra Part III (discussing New Zealand’s recent, and quick,
development in the field of crowdfunding).
15. New Zealand’s system is called “equity” crowdfunding because it is
limited to the issuance of shares of stock. See Joseph J. Dehner & Jin Kong,
Equity-Based Crowdfunding Outside the USA, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 413, 418 (2014)
(“The equity model offers investors the possibility of sharing in the increase over
time in the value of a business, as well as the potential for dividends distributed
from net annual profits of the venture.”). Our domestic system is called
“securities” crowdfunding because United States law permits any type of security,
not just equity, to be crowdfunded. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding
Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2013) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Crowdfunding Securities] (“The new federal CROWDFUND Act authorizes the
‘crowdfunding’ of securities, defined as the sale of unregistered securities over the
Internet to large numbers of retail investors, each of whom only invests a small
dollar amount.”).
16. See infra Part IV.A (noting the time difference between New Zealand and
the United States).
17. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that New Zealand is more successful with
crowdfunding because it is willing to focus on efficiency instead of inclusivity).
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marketplace, conducting local research and interviewing
entrepreneurs, platform operators, investors, lawyers, academics,
and government officials (including the Minister of Commerce).
This Article is based on this original research and analyses of the
United States and New Zealand crowdfunding markets in terms of
inclusivity and efficiency.18
In my research, I found that New Zealand never really had to
grapple with the tension between inclusivity and efficiency, simply
because they are not trying to achieve both goals.19 Rather, as Part
III.C shows, their statute and regulations were designed for
efficiency, and efficiency only.20 Indeed, key components of New
Zealand’s crowdfunding law help achieve efficiency at the direct
expense of inclusivity.21 Platforms are empowered to, and do, take
their role as gatekeepers very seriously, and have always had the
clear power to exclude anyone they wish.22 In the end, they are
rather exclusive, especially the leader, Snowball Effect, which lists
only 2% of the hundreds of companies that ask to be included on
the site.23
With a laser-like focus on efficiency, New Zealand has
established a crowdfunding market that is orders of magnitude
more financially successful than its counterpart in the United
States.24 Data presented in Part IV.A compares the first year of
crowdfunding in New Zealand (2014–2015) with the first year of
crowdfunding in the United States (2016–2017).25 The numbers
18. Other aspects of my research are reported and discussed in other articles,
including Andrew A. Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, 2018 N.Z.
L. REV. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Schwartz, Crowdfunding in New Zealand].
19. See infra Part III.C (noting that New Zealand prefers to focus on
efficiency).
20. See infra Part III.C (stating that New Zealand seeks the utmost
efficiency).
21. See infra Part III.C (noting that New Zealand is willing to risk inclusivity
to promote efficiency).
22. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing how New Zealand promotes efficiency
by allowing platforms to exclude who they want).
23. See infra Part IV.A.1 (describing the exclusivity of crowdfunding
platforms in New Zealand).
24. See infra Part IV.A (detailing New Zealand’s success in the use of
crowdfunding and the efficiency of its use).
25. See infra Part IV.A (comparing New Zealand and the United States’ first
years of crowdfunding).
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are astounding: Scaled for the size of its economy,26 and focusing
on the first year in each jurisdiction, New Zealand had thirteen
times as many crowdfunding campaigns which collectively raised
about thirty times as much capital, and the success rate for New
Zealand crowdfunding campaigns was about 80%, compared with
50% in the United States.27 In other words, freed from a quest for
inclusivity, New Zealand has succeeded in creating a much more
efficient system for channeling capital to startup companies and
small businesses than has the United States.
But the United States had two policy goals, both inclusivity
and efficiency, so it should come as no surprise that New Zealand,
which focused solely on the latter, would outperform on that
front.28 This raises the question of how inclusive the American
system is in practice, and that issue is taken up in Part IV.B, which
analyzes the empirical evidence from crowdfunding’s recently
concluded first year. As will become clear, the data suggests that
American crowdfunding is relatively inclusive, as platforms seem
to exercise their gatekeeping function in a more flexible manner
than in New Zealand.29
In the United States, very young startups that lack revenue,
and that lack pre-existing supporters, are not screened out, but
rather are often given a chance—for better or worse—to pitch their
ideas to the crowd.30 In the United States, the average age of a
crowdfunding company is just two years and almost none have
previous investors; however, in New Zealand, the average age is
eight years and it is common to have pre-existing investors.31 In
terms of demographic inclusiveness, the picture is mixed.32
Finally, the notably lower success rate for crowdfunding
26. New Zealand’s GDP is about 1% that of the United States.
27. See infra Part IV.A (detailing New Zealand’s success).
28. See infra Part IV.A (demonstrating why New Zealand has been more
successful than the United States).
29. See infra Part IV.B (stating New Zealand is more stringent with its
gatekeeping).
30. See infra Part IV.A (demonstrating the United States’ willingness to
include more companies on their crowdfunding platforms).
31. See infra Part IV.A (comparing the average age of crowdfunding startups
in the United States and New Zealand).
32. See infra Part IV.B (discussing demographics of entrepreneurs raising
money through securities crowdfunding).
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campaigns in the United States (50%) compared with New Zealand
(80%) also indicates that the American system is more open and
inclusive of entrepreneurs, and more likely to let a highly
speculative startup at least try to convince the crowd.33
What explains the different approaches to crowdfunding in
America and New Zealand? It is not because New Zealand cares
little for inclusivity, and only about efficiency. Rather, it appears
to stem from the very different levels of other types of startup
capital in each country. The United States has long had the largest
and most mature system of venture capital (VC) and angel
financing in the world, and could afford to use crowdfunding as a
complementary system more focused on inclusive opportunities for
entrepreneurs.34 New Zealand has long had a much thinner pool of
VC and angel financing, even for its size, and had a national
interest in using crowdfunding as a substitute for those forms of
startup finance.35 It could not afford to be distracted by a secondary
goal of inclusivity.
This comparison between the United States and New Zealand
holds a broader lesson that is especially important to the many
other countries currently drafting (or reforming36) their own
crowdfunding laws: Inclusive crowdfunding is a luxury.37 As Part
V explains, jurisdictions with low levels of VC and angel financing
(e.g., Italy and Spain) may wish to ignore inclusivity and just focus
on creating an efficient system for crowdfunding.38 Jurisdictions
that already have abundant VC and angel funding (e.g., Israel and
the United States) can afford to employ crowdfunding as a way to

33. See infra Part IV.B (considering the success rates of crowdfunding
companies in New Zealand and the United States).
34. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the United States’ prowess for venture
capitalism, especially in Silicon Valley).
35. See infra Part IV.B (discussing New Zealand’s general lack of venture
capitalism and use for crowdfunding).
36. The United States, through the Financial Choice Act of 2017, is seeking
to amend its current crowdfunding law. See, e.g., H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 476–
479 (2017) (amending the federal crowdfunding law).
37. See infra Part V (noting how inclusivity provides greater opportunity and
is a policy not followed everywhere else).
38. See infra Part V (elaborating on the trade-off between inclusivity and
efficiency and why a country may choose to focus on one over the other).
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promote entrepreneurial participation among a broad segment of
society.39
II. Securities Crowdfunding in the United States
This Part introduces the concept of securities crowdfunding,
as well as the domestic legal authority and policy behind it.
Authorized by a federal statute in 2012 and implemented through
SEC regulations in 2016, securities crowdfunding has two primary
policy goals: First, it seeks to give promising entrepreneurs an
efficient means of gathering seed capital from the public.40 Second,
it aims to create an inclusive form of entrepreneurial finance that
would give anyone and everyone the opportunity to pitch their idea
to the public.41
These two goals are in fundamental tension, however, because
a fully inclusive system that excluded no one would be hopelessly
inefficient.42 This tension played itself out during the regulatory
process, as the SEC initially adopted a radically inclusive rule but
ended up issuing final regulations that prioritized efficiency at the
expense of inclusivity.43
A. Precursor: Reward Crowdfunding
Securities crowdfunding evolved out of the prior concept of
“reward crowdfunding,” which is practiced on Kickstarter and
other similar websites.44 Reward crowdfunding, in turn, describes
39. See infra Part V (finding that Israel and the United States have other
opportunities for companies to start outside of crowdfunding, allowing for
crowdfunding platforms to be less selective).
40. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 666 (noting that
new literature is discussing the efficiencies of crowdfunding).
41. See id. at 673 (“[A] fundamental and express goal of retail crowdfunding
is to break down the differential treatment of accredited investors and everyone
else.”).
42. See infra Part II.D (discussing the tension between inclusivity and
efficiency in crowdfunding).
43. See infra Part II.D (discussing the final rule eventually implemented by
the SEC).
44. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (noting that
securities crowdfunding was built from reward crowdfunding); Building Rewards,
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an Internet-based marketplace for the financing of entrepreneurial
projects.45 In a typical Kickstarter campaign, an artist or
entrepreneur posts to a dedicated website a description of the
project she wants to pursue, the amount of money she needs to
fund it, and usually promises some sort of reward or benefit to
those who provide funding.46 Members of the public—the
“crowd”—peruse the various projects available on the website,
decide which one(s) they want to support, and then pledge their
money to the cause.47 If a given project reaches its target amount,
the money is collected and transmitted to the entrepreneur; if a
project fails to meet its target, then the deal is off and no money
changes hands.48
For example, a rock band that wants to record an album might
post the idea along with a sample track and ask the crowd to
contribute $20 per person. In return, the band promises to send a
copy of the CD once it is completed. The band uses the money
collected upfront to rent a recording studio, hire a producer, et
cetera. This simple idea has grown in less than a decade into a
multi-billion dollar market: Kickstarter alone reports that over $3
billion has been contributed on its website since its founding in
2009.49
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/handbook/rewards (last visited
Jan. 11, 2018) (discussing common rewards offered in crowdfunding) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (“In reward
crowdfunding, financial backers of a project receive its fruits, such as a book, CD,
or video game.”).
46. See id. (noting different types of rewards offered in exchange for financial
backing).
47. See id. at 672 (“[T]he very concept is to invite ‘the great mass of people’—
the crowd—to invest in whichever startup companies and small businesses they
choose.”).
48. This description is known as an “all-or-nothing” model, which is the type
practiced on the leading reward crowdfunding website, Kickstarter. See
Kickstarter Basics, supra note 5 (stating a project must achieve its monetary
fundraising goals in order to receive the funds). Other reward crowdfunding
websites, including Indiegogo, do not follow this model and allow the
entrepreneur to collect however much money is pledged. See How it Works for
Entrepreneurs, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/how-it-works (last visited
Jan. 11, 2018) (describing “flexible funding”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
49. See Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/
stats (last updated Feb. 17, 2018, 8:50 AM) (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)
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Most importantly for present purposes, Kickstarter and other
reward crowdfunding websites are totally inclusive platforms
where anyone with an idea can post their project and ask the crowd
for funding. Kickstarter does not pre-screen, curate or vet the
projects prior to presenting them to the crowd. Rather, anyone with
a project can participate.50
Many reward crowdfunding projects fail to reach their targets,
of course; on Kickstarter, for example, more than 350,000 projects
in total have been posted, yet only 124,000 of those have been
successfully funded.51 But the crowd is fickle and as such gives its
financial support to certain projects, but not others.52 Indeed, the
huge amount of failed projects is itself an indication of the reward
crowdfunding’s inclusive nature: All entrepreneurs are invited, not
just those with clearly great ideas or those that are likely to get
funded.53
(highlighting over $3 billion pledged, 130,000 funded projects, 14,000,000
backers, and almost 43,000,000 pledges on Kickstarter, alone) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. Kickstarter does have certain prohibitions. It can only be used to fund
“projects,” rather than to raise money for charity or to sell investments. See
Creator
Questions,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/
creator+questions (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that only certain projects
are allowed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Additionally,
certain items are specifically barred. See Prohibited Items, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/rules/prohibited (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)
(prohibiting medical treatments, pornographic material and other “illegal,
heavily regulated, or potentially dangerous” projects) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). But the key point is that Kickstarter would
not exclude a project because it thinks it is a poor idea, or because it doubts the
capabilities of the entrepreneur. See Creator Questions, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/creator+questions (last visited Jan. 11,
2018) (“[W]e do not investigate a creator’s ability to complete their project.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Moreover, many of the types of
campaigns that are barred from Kickstarter, such as charitable donations, would
be welcome on other crowdfunding sites. See, e.g., GOFUNDME,
https://www.gofundme.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that it is a
crowdfunding site that welcomes charitable campaigns) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See Kickstarter Stats, supra note 49 (presenting total activity on
Kickstarter).
52. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 672 (noting that
the crowd donates to whichever companies it wants, but not necessarily every
company will receive funding).
53. See id. at 662 (“Retail crowdfunding is the most inclusive form of
securities crowdfunding, in the sense that everyone is invited regardless of who
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This inclusive nature of reward crowdfunding introduces
certain costs. Because only 35% of the projects posted on
Kickstarter succeed and obtain funding, this means that a large
majority of the projects posted end up as a waste of time and
resources for the creators and backers.54 To post a project takes
time and effort; creators commonly produce a video, draft copy,
promote the project, and so on.55 And backers who review and
pledge their support spend time and energy researching their
choices. But if the project fails to reach its target fundraising
amount, all of those resources go down the drain, with nothing to
show for it.56 To date, about $340 million has been pledged on
Kickstarter to projects that ultimately failed.57
On the other hand, the costs of reward crowdfunding are
pretty modest overall. The cost of creating and posting a project
proposal is generally pretty low, due to the simple online format.58
The market is almost totally unregulated; thus, the compliance
costs are de minimis. Given that the whole market takes place on
the Internet, the research effort expended by backers who invest
in failed projects is probably small in most instances. Moreover,
even a project that does not reach its target may still benefit the
company by, for instance, forcing the founders to concretize and
document their ideas for the business. Finally, just because 65% of
projects fail, this does not necessarily imply that market
participants spent 65% of their time and energy on that group.
Rather, the 35% of successful projects may well have commanded

they are.”).
54. See Kickstarter Stats, supra note 49 (finding that the failure rate on
Kickstarter is over 35%).
55. See Kickstarter Basics, supra note 5 (noting some things project creators
often do to attempt to create a successful project).
56. However, some reward crowdfunding sites, like Indiegogo, do not follow
an all-or-nothing model, and thus, any amount that is pledged is ultimately
collected by the creator. See Choose Your Funding Type: Can I Keep My Money?,
INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/205138007-ChooseYour-Funding-Type-Can-I-Keep-My-Money- (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating
that a project can keep the money donated to it even if it does not achieve its goal)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
57. See Kickstarter Stats, supra note 49 (noting the statistics of failed
projects).
58. See infra Part II.B (discussing the efficiencies of crowdfunding).

THE GATEKEEPERS OF CROWDFUNDING

897

90% of the market’s attention. All in all, reward crowdfunding
seems like a fairly efficient way to raise capital.
B. Crowdfunding Under the JOBS Act59
Securities crowdfunding takes the concept of reward
crowdfunding and extends it to investments.60 It works just like
reward crowdfunding except that, instead of receiving a tangible
reward, like a CD from a band, the financial backers get a share of
stock or some other financial interest, such as a share in the band’s
profits on the sale of the CD.61
This novel method of online investing holds great promise, but
it also violates the usual legal rules for making a public offer of
securities.62 For, under the federal Securities Act of 1933,63 an
entrepreneur is legally required to “register” any shares of stock,
bonds, or other securities before offering them to the public.64 This
registration process calls for copious public disclosure about the

59. This Section is adapted from a similar discussion in, Andrew A.
Schwartz, Crowdfunding Social Enterprise in New Zealand, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW (Joseph Yockey & Benjamin Means eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, Crowdfunding
Social Enterprise].
60. See 158 Cong. Rec. S1,824-02 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Merkley) (explaining that securities crowdfunding is based on reward
crowdfunding of the sort practiced on Kickstarter); Schwartz, Inclusive
Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (noting that securities crowdfunding was
spurred by reward crowdfunding).
61. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (“Securities
crowdfunding takes the concept one step further by providing backers with a
security, such as a share of stock, without registering the securities with the
authorities.”).
62. See id. (“Selling securities in this way does not violate the federal
securities laws (which generally mandate that one register securities with the
SEC before offering them to the public) because legal ‘exemptions’ have been put
into place. . . .”).
63. Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa
(2012)).
64. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your
Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 918
(2011) (noting that, under the Securities Act of 1933, a company had to register
its stock before issuing it).
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company, the securities to be offered, et cetera, and it is a legal
mandate for all public offerings.65
The securities laws expressly allow for “exemptions” to the
registration requirement, however, and a new exemption for
crowdfunding was created by the federal government in Title III of
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 201266 (JOBS Act).
This statute was passed with bipartisan support, and many states,
including Colorado and Georgia, have since followed with similar
legislation.67 The enthusiasm for securities crowdfunding is
primarily based on the widely shared view that the traditional
initial public offering (IPO) process in the United States had
become so onerous and expensive that many worthwhile
companies either cannot or choose not to obtain funding from the
public—to the detriment of us all.68
One reason why IPOs are so expensive is the high cost of
complying with securities laws and regulations.69 Under
traditional securities laws, all securities must be first registered
with the SEC or similar agency before being offered for sale to the
public.70 This registration process generally requires that the
company provide full and clear disclosure of the risks of investing
in the IPO, and then provide ongoing disclosures once the company
is public.71 Over the years—the American statute dates from the
65. See id. at 884 (stating that securities must be registered).
66. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77r, 78a–78o (2012)); see Scwhartz,
Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (“Retail crowdfunding is exempt
under Title III of the new JOBS Act, accredited crowdfunding is exempt under
Title II of the JOBS Act, and intrastate crowdfunding is exempt under the
longstanding intrastate exemption.”).
67. See Scwhartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 669 (“[R]oughly
one-third of states have adopted legislation authorizing securities crowdfunding
within their borders, including Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Tennessee, and Texas.”).
68. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1458 (“[T]he
costs associated with crowdfunding securities will be so much lower than costs in
a traditional IPO. . . .”).
69. See id. at 1467 (“By offering starkly lower compliance and promotion
costs than a traditional IPO, crowdfunding greatly reduces the cost of raising
capital from the public for small entrepreneurs.”).
70. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 64, at 918 (noting that ordinary
securities must be registered before distributed).
71. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1466
(“[R]equir[ing] that the issuer provide full and clear disclosure of the risks and
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1930s—these disclosure requirements have become increasingly
demanding thanks to the accumulation of legislative amendments
and regulatory commands, to the point that the process of going
public costs several million dollars in legal, accounting, and other
fees.72 This has discouraged all but the largest and most successful
companies to conduct an IPO.73
Securities crowdfunding responds to this problem by
exempting crowdfunded offerings from the usual registration and
disclosure requirements for public offerings.74 By eliminating the
substantial attorney costs, underwriting costs, printing costs, and
accounting costs associated with the preparation of a registration
statement, this allows for much lower compliance costs than a
traditional IPO.75 The company likewise need not comply with the
ongoing (and costly) reporting requirements for public
companies.76
In addition to lower compliance costs, securities crowdfunding
also offers a much less expensive means of promoting an offering
of stock.77 An important component of conducting a traditional IPO
is the so-called “road show.”78 This is a series of in-person meetings
and presentations to potential investors and which requires the
hiring of public relations, catering, travel, printing, and many

potential rewards of investing in the securities, and then provide ongoing,
regular, and event-based disclosures.”).
72. See id. at 1467 (“[T]oday, the process of going public costs millions of
dollars in legal, accounting, and other fees and, in a potentially related
development, the number of companies electing to do so has shrunk to an all time
low.”).
73. See id. at 1468 (“[A] registered public offering is just too expensive for all
but the largest issuers.”).
74. See id. at 1460 (noting that the CROWDFUND Act exempts
crowdfunding entrepreneurs from the registration requirement).
75. See id. at 1458 (noting that those costs associated with crowdfunding are
lesser than those associate with a traditional IPO).
76. See id. at 1470 (showing that crowdfunding securities are exempt from
the costly registration and promotion fees of the traditional IPO).
77. See id. at 1467 (noting that crowdfunding greatly reduces the cost of
raising capital).
78. See id. at 1470 (discussing the “carefully choreographed procedure called
a ‘road show’”).
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other types of consultants and specialists.79 In other words, it is
expensive.80
In securities crowdfunding, by contrast, there is no need for a
physical road show, because it will take place entirely over the
Internet.81 In this way, the cost of promoting a crowdfunded
offering will be much lower than an IPO.82 Even so, American
securities crowdfunding is not entirely free of regulatory red tape
and the associated cost of compliance.83
The JOBS Act authorized securities crowdfunding, but also
imposed many limits and rules on the practice.84 There are hard
monetary limitations both for companies and for investors.85
Companies are only allowed to raise up to $1 million each year
and,86 for investors, the law provides a limit on the amount of
crowdfunded securities that any one investor may purchase per
year. The maximum amount an investor may contribute is
premised on a sliding scale based on income and net worth; for
most people this will calculate out to about $2,000–$5,000.87 The
purpose of this investment cap is to protect investors from putting
more at risk than they can reasonably afford.88
79. See id. (“The road show is not a legal requirement, but is a practical one,
given the norms of the major banks that orchestrate IPOs. This is an expensive
endeavor that calls for public relations, catering, travel, printing, and many other
types of specialists, each of whom command premium fees.”).
80. See id. (noting the extreme cost of a traditional IPO).
81. See id. (“Another important factor is the lower cost of promoting a
crowdfunded issue via the Internet as opposed to an in-person road show.”).
82. See id. (noting that the internet saves both time and money for
crowdfunding companies).
83. See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the
Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 1573, 1605 (2013) (stating it is still difficult to navigate the compliance
matters in JOBS).
84. See id. (noting that instead of creating “a regulation-free zone,” the JOBS
Act imposed “a quite heavy and costly set of responsibilities on both issuers and
any intermediaries that assist them”).
85. See id. at 1604 (stating that there is no need to register securities, but
there are limitations on what can be raised).
86. See id. (noting that an issuer can raise only up to one million dollars in
a transaction).
87. See id. (“[T]he main investor protection would have come through
wealth- and income-based limits on how much any single investor could
invest. . . .”).
88. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1461 (stating
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Under the JOBS Act, transactions must be executed via a
financial intermediary registered with the SEC; thus they cannot
be consummated directly between issuer and investor.89 The
financial intermediaries (also known as “platforms” or “portals”)
have numerous responsibilities under the law, including that they
ensure that each investor reviews certain educational information
and positively affirms certain statements, such as that they are
risking the loss of their entire investment.90 Companies may not
advertise the offering themselves; any solicitations must go
through the intermediary.91
Any private domestic company (except “investment
companies”) may invoke the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding
exemption.92 Public companies, such as those that trade on the
New York Stock Exchange, as well as foreign companies, are thus
excluded.93 Companies must provide numerous disclosures to
investors, intermediaries and the SEC, including the name,
address, and website of the company; the names of directors,
officers, and substantial investors; a description of the business
and the anticipated business plan; a description of the issuer’s
financial condition (which varies based on amount raised); a
description of the purpose and intended use of the proceeds; the
price of the securities; and a description of the ownership and
capital structure of the issuer.94
The JOBS Act provides that companies must state a target for
their fundraising goal, and are to receive the money only if the
that the caps are for the protection of investors from losing too much money in
investments with fewer regulations).
89. See id. at 1462 (noting how financial intermediaries act for the protection
of the investor and issuer).
90. See id. at 1462–63 (detailing the responsibilities intermediaries have in
the process).
91. See id. at 1464 (“Issuers are prohibited from advertising the offering
themselves, and any solicitation of the offering must go through the registered
funding portal.”).
92. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 83, at 1575 (“[S]ome offerings
of securities are exempt from ’33 Act requirements because they are ‘private’ or
otherwise limited in terms of size, scope, or nature of investors being solicited.”).
93. See id. (noting that only private companies can be exempt).
94. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1464
(“Although the purpose of the Act is to lower the cost of capital for startups by
alleviating burdensome disclosure requirements, a crowdfunding business must
provide some very basic disclosures to the SEC. . . .”).
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target is met or exceeded.95 During the pendency of an offer, all
investors have the right to cancel their order at any time.96 If the
funding campaign succeeds, the company must provide annual
reports to investors and the SEC for as long as the securities
remain outstanding.97 Also, crowdfunded securities cannot be
transferred or sold by investors for one year after the date of
purchase, unless being transferred to the issuer, as part of an
offering registered by the SEC, or to an accredited investor or
family member.98
Finally, to protect investors, the JOBS Act specifically
authorizes civil actions for fraud against issuers, directors, and
officers of companies that mislead crowdfunding investors.99 State
and federal government authorities, including the SEC, likewise
are empowered to take action against wrongdoers.100
The JOBS Act created the basic framework for securities
crowdfunding in 2012, but many issues were delegated to the SEC
to flesh out through rulemaking.101 Perhaps because the SEC was
very busy with other matters, it took the agency several years to
propose and finalize the regulatory framework for crowdfunding.102
95. See id. at 1463 (“The intermediary cannot deliver the proceeds of the
offering to the company until the target amount has been reached or
exceeded. . . .”).
96. See id. (noting that the intermediary “must allow investors the
opportunity to cancel investment commitments before then”).
97. See id. at 1464 (“Finally, following a crowdfunding round, an issuer must
annually file with the SEC, and make available to investors financial statements
and a report on the results of operations.”).
98. See id. at 1463 (stating that crowdfunding securities cannot be
transferred within one year “unless being transferred to the issuer, an accredited
investor, a family member of the purchaser, or as part of an offering registered
with the SEC”).
99. See id. at 1465 (noting a party will be liable if they “make[] an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact required to be stated
or necessary in order to make the statements . . . not misleading”).
100. See id. at 1465 (“[T]he SEC is granted ‘examination, enforcement and
other rulemaking authority’ over funding portals, and presumably retains
authority to enforce the various statutory and regulatory mandates for both
issuers and intermediaries.”).
101. See id. at 1462 (“Crowdfunding transactions cannot be consummated
directly between issuer and investor, but rather must be executed via a financial
intermediary registered with the SEC.”).
102. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 669 (“[D]ue to
competing priorities, the SEC missed the deadline and issued only a preliminary
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The SEC published 585 pages of proposed regulations in October
2013 and invited public comment thereon.103 Two years later, in
November 2015, the SEC promulgated the final version of
Regulation Crowdfunding, which weighed in at nearly 700
pages.104 Securities crowdfunding under the JOBS Act and
Regulation Crowdfunding finally commenced in May 2016.105
C. Policy Goals: Efficiency and Inclusivity
Congress enacted securities crowdfunding in large part to
benefit entrepreneurs.106 The statute was even called the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act! In that law, signed by
President Obama, the government sought to create a public
securities market that would be both efficient and inclusive.107
“Efficient” in the sense of an effective and low-cost method of
raising business capital for startup and other small companies.108
‘Inclusive’ in the sense of a system that is open to any entrepreneur
who wants to participate—just like in reward crowdfunding.109

proposal in late 2013.”).
103. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 227 (2017).
105. Id. § 200.
106. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1466
(“[C]rowdfunding will emerge as an important, low-cost method of raising
business capital from the public, thus expanding the opportunity for
entrepreneurship.”).
107. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 666, 671
(discussing the attention paid to efficiency and inclusivity).
108. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 457 (“[I]t will
liberate startup companies to use peer networks and the Internet to obtain
modest amounts of capital at low cost.”).
109. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 671 (“An
inclusive environment, broadly defined as one in which ‘all people feel valued and
respected and have access to the same opportunities,’ can generate positive
effects.”). There are other policy goals behind crowdfunding, including a wish to
empower retail investors to buy securities that have traditionally been offered to
institutional or accredited investors, but the present work is focused on the
interests of entrepreneurs.
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1. Efficient Capital Raising

Startup companies, simply meaning companies that were only
recently formed, are beneficial to the economy in that they enhance
innovation, economic growth, and employment.110 They are risky,
and many eventually go out of business, but those that survive
commonly
“create
satisfying
employment
opportunities
and . . . products or services that improve our quality of life.”111
Hence it is in the public interest to encourage the formation and
development of startup companies.
Nevertheless, startups commonly have trouble obtaining the
capital financing they need to get off the ground.112 The usual first
source for startup financing is from personal savings, or from
friends and family, but many people have limited savings and lack
wealthy connections.113 Furthermore, banks are broadly hesitant
to extend credit to startup companies in their early years, simply
because the risk is too high.114 Professional early-stage investors,
such as angel investors and venture capital funds, are potentially
available, but there is tremendous competition for such funding,
and they commonly focus on startups in certain geographic areas,
like Silicon Valley.115 Finally, a startup could solicit investments
from the public through an IPO.116 That process is heavily
regulated by the securities laws, however, and compliance costs

110. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System,
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052748703396604576088272112103698 (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)
(“[V]ibrant entrepreneurialism is the key to our global leadership and the success
of our people.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
111. Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 620.
112. See id. at 621 (“This lack of access to financing disproportionately affects
certain types of entrepreneurs, namely those that are ‘out-of-the-loop’ for one
reason or another and do not have connections with angel investors or other
wealthy financiers.”).
113. See id. (stating that it is uncommon to have access to a large sum of
money at the start of a company).
114. See id. (noting how startups often resort to the use of credit cards to
finance their start).
115. See id. at 621–22 (commenting on how it can be difficult, and highly
competitive, to secure financing from a venture capitalist).
116. See id. at 622 (noting that it is possible to take the business public
through an IPO, but that comes with its own set of risks).
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can easily run to several million dollars, “making an IPO
economically infeasible for nearly all early-stage startups.”117
Based on these difficulties, Congress saw a need to create a
simple and low-cost method of capital-raising for startup
companies, and decided to adapt the crowdfunding concept to serve
this purpose.118 Thus, the first policy goal of securities
crowdfunding is to provide startup companies with an efficient way
to raise capital from the public.119 The exemption to the securities
laws allows startups to sell stock or other securities to the public
in a simple, low-cost manner, and without having to comply with
the heavy legal, regulatory and practical costs of issuing registered
securities.120
2. Inclusive Entrepreneurship
Securities crowdfunding was also designed to promote an
inclusive vision of entrepreneurship.121 The traditional way to
obtain startup business capital has long been through asking
friends and family, angel investors and venture capitalists.122 But
what about entrepreneurs of modest means, without a rich uncle,
and who lack wealthy friends? What about entrepreneurs who live
far from Silicon Valley?123 Unfortunately, entrepreneurs who are
117. Id.
118. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep it Light, Chairman White: SEC
Rulemaking Under the JOBS Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 46 (2013) (“The
whole crowdfunding project depends on a very simple and inexpensive process for
offering securities.”).
119. See id. at 44 (“[T]he Act seeks to create an ultralow-cost method for
startup companies, small business, farmers, and others. . . .”).
120. See id. at 47 (“The Act provides a new means for companies to raise
capital from investors by establishing an exemption to the Securities Act of 1933
for crowdfunded securities.”).
121. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 673 (“One core
pillar of securities crowdfunding is the idea of an inclusive system that invites all
investors to participate.”).
122. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 621 (“The traditional
first source for entrepreneurial financing is from the entrepreneur’s friends and
family, as well as their own personal savings.”).
123. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J.
283, 283–84 (2013) [hereinafter Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding] (noting that
most investors live in major metropolitan cities); accord Calida Smylie, Should
Regulators Increase the Equity Crowdfunding Limit?, NAT’L BUS. REV., July 1,

906

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885 (2018)

‘out of the loop’ for one reason or another appear to have a difficult
time getting startup financing. This includes women and racial
minorities,124 as well as young entrepreneurs125 and those from
rural areas.126
Crowdfunding—being entirely Internet-based—is supposed to
give everyone the opportunity to try to raise capital from the
crowd, regardless of what they look like, how old they are, or where
they are from.127 As President Obama said when he signed the
JOBS Act, “[f]or startups and small businesses, this bill is a
potential game changer,” Obama said at a White House signing
ceremony flanked by lawmakers from both parties. “Startups and
small business will now have access to a big new pool of potential
investors, namely the American people.”128 The inclusive vision is
that “anyone who can convince the public he has a good business
idea can become an entrepreneur” through crowdfunding.129
In short, a second key policy goal of securities crowdfunding in
the United States was to create an inclusive system that would
give anyone with a business idea the opportunity to list her
2016 [hereinafter Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Limit?] (“[E]arly stage companies
are basically left with the options of funds and high net worth individuals, which
can be an obscure and fragmented market to navigate if you’re not well
connected.”).
124. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 622 (“[T]his problem
appears to be exacerbated for women and racial minorities.”).
125. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 515,
516 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding] (noting it is difficult
for teenagers to secure start-up financing).
126. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 623 (noting that
people in rural areas can often have a harder time receiving funding from venture
capitalists or angel investors).
127. See id. at 624 (“Not just those in Silicon Valley; not just those with
wealthy friends; not just those with connections. Crowdfunding will be open to
anyone. . . .”); C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 104 (“Crowdfunding . . . gives poorer
entrepreneurs whose friends and family lack the wealth to provide seed capital
somewhere else to turn.”).
128. Alexandra Alper, Obama Signs Bill to Boost Business Startups, REUTERS
(Apr. 5, 2012, 3:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-jobsact/obamasigns-bill-to-boost-business-startups-idUSBRE83414F20120405 (last visited Jan.
11, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. See Bradford, supra note 127, at 10; see also id. at 101 (“Crowdfunding
allows an entrepreneur to publish her request for funding to the entire
world. . . .”).
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business on a crowdfunding website and solicit investments from
the American people.130 As illustrated below, however, this
radically inclusive vision of crowdfunding was so threatening to
efficiency that it was softened, and nearly overturned, by the
SEC.131
D. Tension Between Inclusivity and Efficiency—Regulatory
History
Securities crowdfunding has a fundamental tension at its core
between inclusivity and efficiency, and the two goals must be
balanced or traded off against one another. The goal of an inclusive
marketplace, in the sense that there are no gatekeepers and any
entrepreneur can pitch directly to the crowd, was part of the
original vision of securities crowdfunding.132 The SEC, in the draft
regulations it released for public comment in 2013, operationalized
this policy goal by denying platforms the power to curate or screen
the issuers listing on their site.133 This sweeping notion of a fully
inclusive securities marketplace, where any and every
entrepreneur was to be given a chance, was subsequently
squelched by the SEC.134 The SEC recognized it had to make a
tradeoff between inclusivity and efficiency and ultimately decided
to advance efficiency at the expense of inclusivity.135 The final
version of the regulations do empower platforms to curate and
130. See Darian Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, 95 N.C. L. REV.
1481, 1489 (2017) (“[F]unding portals were originally to play a passive role in the
crowdfunding process. They were not designed to guide investors toward the best
startups—that was left up to the ‘crowd.’”).
131. See infra notes 222–236 and accompanying text (discussing the limits
the SEC placed on securities crowdfunding in the United States).
132. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 673 (“Inclusivity
is essential to crowdfunding and drives the theory underlying the form.”).
133. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,485–87 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227).
134. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 672 (noting the
SEC, as well as scholars, believe “[t]he essence of the concept is the creation of an
inclusive market where ordinary investors will be able to make investments that
have traditionally been the exclusive purview of wealthy and connected
investors”).
135. See infra notes 136–140 and accompanying text (discussing how
Congress limited inclusiveness in favor of efficiency).
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select which entrepreneurs to include, and which to exclude.136
This section recounts the regulatory process where this important
change was made.
In 2013, the SEC published its initial version of Regulation
Crowdfunding and solicited comments from the public.137 Two
years later, in 2015, the SEC promulgated the final version of
Regulation Crowdfunding, incorporating changes suggested by
public commenters.138 Among the most significant changes
between the proposed and the final regulations was the alteration
of Rule 402(b)(1).139
Rule 402(b)(1) governs whether and to what extent a funding
portal is permitted to decide which companies to allow to list on its
site.140 Under the original version of the Rule, funding portals were
to play “an almost completely passive role.”141 If an entrepreneur
wanted to post their business and solicit investments from the
crowd, a funding portal had to allow her on its site, regardless of
the portal’s view of the company or its prospects.142 Indeed, Rule
402(b)(1), as originally proposed, specifically stated that “a funding
portal may not deny access to an issuer based on the advisability
of investing in the issuer or its offering.”143 This was a radically
inclusive rule: Every entrepreneur had to be included, and none
could be excluded. 144
136. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1) (2017) (allowing discretion over who can
use a platform and who cannot).
137. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,428.
138. 17 C.F.R. § 227.
139. Compare Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (detailing the proposed rule), with 17 C.F.R. §
227.402(b)(1) (detailing the final rule).
140. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1) (“A funding portal may . . . [d]etermine
whether and under what terms to allow an issuer to offer and sell securities in
reliance on section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act.”).
141. Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1496; see also Schwartz, Crowdfunding
Securities, supra note 15, at 1462 n.25 (stating the portal’s only purpose was to
connect buyers and sellers, and nothing else).
142. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,560 (“A funding portal
may . . . apply objective criteria to limit the securities offered in reliance on
Section 4(a)(6) . . . .”).
143. Crowdfunding, Release No. 33-9479, 107 S.E.C. Docket 2728 (proposed
Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9470.pdf.
144. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1481 (“Funding portals were originally
conceived of as almost completely passive entities who could not subjectively
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The statutory basis for the SEC’s proposed Rule 402(b)(1) was
found in a portion of the JOBS Act that prohibited funding portals
from “offer[ing] investment advice or recommendations.”145 The
SEC took the view, at least at first, that to allow a portal to pick
and choose who to permit on its site would be an implicit form of
advice that the issuers it selected were worthy investments, and
those that it rejected were not.146
The proposed Rule 402(b)(1) did have two exceptions to this
basic prohibition on screening issuers: First, the portal was
permitted to exclude an issuer that “present[ed] the potential for
fraud or otherwise raise[d] investor protection concerns.”147
Second, the portal could have used “objective criteria” to select the
issuers it allowed on its site.148 So, a portal could have specialized
in technology companies,149 or those from a certain geographic
area,150 and exclude any issuers who did not fit the bill. But if an
issuer did come within the objective criteria, the portal would be
forced to include it, regardless of what it thought of the company
and its prospects.151 If a portal devoted itself to, say, women-owned
businesses, then it would have had to allow any and every
woman-owned business to list on its site.
When the SEC put out its proposed Regulation
Crowdfunding for public comment, Rule 402(b)(1) received a wave
of criticism.152 Just like a regular stock exchange, funding portals
‘curate’ (or screen) the startups that wished to list on the sites.”).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80)(A) (2012) (defining funding portal as “any
person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of
securities for the account of others, solely pursuant to Section 4(6) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77d(6))”).
146. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,486 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (“[A] funding portal may not use criteria based
on an assessment of the merits or the shortcomings of a particular issuer or
offering. In particular, a funding portal may not deny access to an issuer based
on the advisability of investing in the issuer or its offering.”).
147. Id. at 66,463.
148. Id. at 66,486.
149. See id. (including “business segment” as a permissible objective
criterion).
150. See id. (including “geographic location” as a permissible objective
criterion).
151. See id. (explaining that the objective criteria were designed to prevent
the appearance that the funding portal was providing investment advice).
152. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,462 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be
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have a fundamental business need to cultivate and protect a sound
reputation among investors, otherwise people may not be willing
to invest their money on the site.153 Had Rule 402(b)(1) gone into
effect as proposed, it would have been impossible for a funding
portal to generate and protect its reputation for only listing
companies with good prospects.154 Thus by forcing a portal to
include every entrepreneur who asked, the SEC’s proposed rule
would have undermined “the viability of the funding portal
industry, and thus the crowdfunding market” as a whole.155
In essence, the commenters were concerned that the SEC’s
proposal privileged inclusivity over efficiency (although they did
not put it in precisely these terms) and the SEC ultimately
agreed.156 The SEC concurred that the system would only work, or
would at least work much better, if funding portals had the power
to select which companies to include, and which to exclude, from
its site.157

codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (“We received a significant number of comments on
the ability of a funding portal to limit the offerings on its platform . . . .”).
153. See EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER
IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE 29 (2015) (“A stock exchange that fails to provide
assurances or attempts to stack the deck in favor of its members at the expense
of investors will attract fewer investors in its market in the long run.”); id. at 81
(“By providing extra assurances to investors, the New York Stock
Exchange . . . increases the demand for its market. Here the exchange acts as a
reputational intermediary, providing the equivalent of a Good Housekeeping Seal
of Approval on listed firms.” (citing JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE
REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET 199–210
(2013))).
154. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,462
Commenters asserted that a funding portal’s ability to limit the
offerings on its platform is important for investor protection. They
stated that funding portals should be permitted to screen out clearly
unprepared or ill-conceived offerings, and should be permitted to limit
offerings on their platforms to issuers that are “crowdfund-ready”.
155. Id.
156. See id. (“We acknowledge the concerns raised by commenters that the
proposed rules could otherwise have unduly restricted a funding portal’s ability
to limit offerings conducted on its platform, and we are modifying the safe harbor
contained in Rule 402(b)(1) to address these concerns.”).
157. See id. (“Specifically, we are revising Rule 402(b)(1) to read that a
funding portal may ‘[d]etermine whether and under what terms to allow an issuer
to offer and sell securities . . . through its platform, provided that the funding
portal otherwise complies with Regulation Crowdfunding . . . .’”).
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The SEC was probably correct in concluding that a ban on
platform curation would have led to significant inefficiencies for all
market participants: Investors would have had to wade through
tons of unsuitable investments in order to find the ones they like.158
Investments would have been spread very thinly among many
issuers, leading to many failed campaigns, as the combination of
the investor cap and the all-or-nothing rule would make it difficult
for any given issuer to reach its target amount. Platforms, who
generally are compensated through a “success fee” paid by a
company that meets its target, would have had to charge higher
fees to account for the time and resources they waste on the many
unsuccessful campaigns. And since the overall success rate would
be relatively low in an un-curated marketplace, a large percentage
of issuers would have wasted their time and effort trying to get
funding. Without going any further, it is clear that the SEC was
likely right in concluding that the proposed version of Rule
402(b)(1) would have led to massive inefficiency and perhaps a
total breakdown in the system.159
The agency accordingly revised Rule 402(b)(1) to expressly
allow a funding portal to “exercise its discretion . . . to limit the
offerings and issuers that it allows on its platform.”160 Its revised
version of Rule 402(b)(1) states, in no uncertain terms, “A funding
portal may . . . [d]etermine whether and under what terms to allow
an issuer to offer and sell securities . . . through its platform.”161
Thus the final Regulation Crowdfunding, which is presently in
effect, authorizes and empowers funding portals to exclude what

158. See also Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,487 (proposed Nov. 5,
2013) (providing search functions to help users to “search, sort, or categorize”
offerings to more efficiently find desired offerings).
159. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1498 (quoting other commentator’s
contention that failure to change the rule “could have spelled disaster for the
nascent crowdfunding industry” (quoting Evan Engstrom, The Good and the Bad
in the SEC’s New Crowdfunding Rules, ENGINE (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.engine.is/news/issues/the-good-and-the-bad-in-the-secs-newcrwdfunding-rules/6124 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review))).
160. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,463 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227).
161. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1) (2017).
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they perceived to be low-quality companies with poor prospects or
too much risk.162
This important change between the SEC’s proposed and final
regulations is telling. The radically inclusive vision presented in
the proposed Rule 402(b)(1) was that anyone with a business idea
would be granted the legal right to present her idea to the crowd
and ask for their financial backing.163 You do not need to impress
the VCs, the angels, the banks, the “guys in suits”—you get your
shot. Regardless of whether you are a teenager,164 a racial
minority,165 or live far from Silicon Valley,166 everyone and every
idea was welcome.
But this “revolutionary” idea of a totally inclusive marketplace
for entrepreneurial finance was snuffed out without even being
given a chance.167 The SEC concluded, again, probably correctly,
that some level of exclusivity is needed for crowdfunding to work;
total inclusivity is simply too inefficient to function.168 Congress
may have had dual purposes when it authorized securities
162. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,463 (“[W]e are providing funding
portals with broad discretion to determine whether and under what
circumstances to allow an issuer to offer and sell securities through its
platform . . . .”).
163. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,486 (requiring that limitations of
funding portals use objective criteria “required to be reasonably designed to result
in a broad selection of issuers”).
164. See Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding, supra note 125, at 516 (describing
how the CROWDFUND Act opened crowdfunding opportunities to those under
age twenty-one).
165. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 623 (referencing
recent literature showing that “most startups founded by African-Americans
receive little or no outside financing from any source”).
166. See id. (highlighting the geographical disadvantage of those who do not
live in communities with large potential funding basis); Schwartz, Rural
Crowdfunding, supra note 123, at 283 (discussing the localization of early stage
investment and its impact on rural entrepreneurs).
167. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1485 (observing that crowdfunding’s
move toward an expert-based system resembles a model closer to the existent
angel and venture capital models).
168. See id. at 1496 (arguing that “expert curation is optimal in startup
investing”). Indeed, one thoughtful commentator has repeatedly suggested that
crowdfunding’s efficiency would be greatly improved if the SEC went even further
than the current Rule 402(b)(1) and allowed even more curation and exclusivity.
See id. at 1496 (advocating that “funding portals should be allowed to do more
screening of startups” (citing Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market
for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 603–06 (2015))).
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crowdfunding—both efficiency and inclusivity—but the SEC
privileged one over the other in its final Rule 402(b)(1).169 And this
makes sense, as an inclusive system isn’t worth much if nobody
actually uses it. In any event, the present system of American
securities crowdfunding prioritizes efficiency over inclusivity.
Certain minor aspects designed to promote inclusivity for
entrepreneurs do remain part of the SEC’s final regulatory
framework. For one thing, the SEC’s final regulations still do
require platforms to use objective criteria when highlighting
offerings within the platform.170 Thus they may not put a set of
recommended investments on the home page and relegate the rest
to sub-pages.171 Similarly, platforms must also use objective
criteria when providing search functions on its site.172 However,
these aspects of the rules are obviously of no use to a company who
is excluded from the site altogether. Thus, the system is, at its core,
not as inclusive of entrepreneurs as was originally framed.
In conclusion, the SEC’s final rules prioritize efficiency over
inclusivity in that they allow portals to screen and reject
companies that they do not want to list.173 The SEC changed Rule
402(b)(1) because it understood that it had to make a trade-off
between efficiency and inclusivity. The agency’s counterpart in

169. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,462 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (explaining the SEC’s response to the public
comments with regards to granting funding portals discretion over limiting
platform accessibility).
170. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(2) (2017).
171. See id § 227.402(b)(2)(ii) (“[T]he funding portal may not highlight an
issuer or offering based on the advisability of investing in the issuer or its
offering . . . .”).
172. See id. § 227.402(b)(3) (“A funding portal may . . . [p]rovide search
functions or other tools that investors can use to search, sort, or categorize the
offerings available through the funding portal’s platform according to objective
criteria . . . .”).
173. Cf. STRINGHAM, supra note 153, at 30
The terms “closing it to ‘outsiders’” and “exclusion” have negative
connotations to many, but a voluntary association would not be
voluntary if everyone were forced together against their will. . . . Even
though exclusion is an important part of a social system based on
voluntary relations, the system would be much more inclusive
overall. . . . [E]xclusion is nothing more than people deciding with
whom they want to interact.
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New Zealand, however, never had to make that trade-off, as the
next Part will discuss.174
III. Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand
While the idea of crowdfunding securities originated in the
United States and the federal JOBS Act of 2012 provided the first
template for this new form, other countries quickly took steps to
emulate this American innovation.175 New Zealand in particular
took the idea and ran with it, to the point that it had its market up
and running two years ahead of the Americans.176 This Part
discusses the distinctive New Zealand model of crowdfunding in
advance of Part IV, which will compare the New Zealand and
United States regimes in terms of efficiency and inclusivity.
A. New Zealand as Comparator
Much of the remainder of this Article will compare and
contrast the crowdfunding laws and markets in New Zealand and
the United States. This sort of analysis depends, of course, on the
two countries being comparable. Despite obvious differences
between them—New Zealand is a small island nation with less
than five million people, including a large Polynesian population,
located in the South Pacific177—they are actually quite similar in
174. See infra Part III (discussing the evolution of crowdfunding in New
Zealand).
175. See Ross S. Weinstein, Note, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad:
What to Expect When You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 427, 427–49, 437–
438 (2013) (suggesting that crowdfunding through established portals emerged
contemporaneously in Europe and tracing the crowdfunding phenomenon’s
growth around the world).
176. See Dehner & Kong, supra note 15, at 437 (“New Zealand equity and
lending based crowdfunding laws became effective in April of 2014.”); Ibrahim,
supra note 130, at 1488 (noting that although the JOBS Act was passed in 2012,
the market set-up was delayed until the SEC could implement the final rules in
2016).
177. See World Factbook: New Zealand, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2017),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_nz.html
(last updated Dec. 12, 2017) (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (providing general
statistical information about New Zealand) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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their history and legal structure: Both began as British colonies,
both speak English, both are developed countries with a
democratic form of government and a legal system based on the
common law, both even use dollars as their currency.178
While comparative analyses are never perfect, many legal
scholars have concluded that the similarities between New
Zealand and the United States are close enough to make at least
rough and broad comparisons between them.179 This is true in
many areas of law. Scholars of tort law, in particular, have
frequently compared the United States tort system with the rather
different approach that New Zealand has followed since the
1970s.180 In addition, many leading American tort law casebooks
“contain extensive treatment of New Zealand’s system,”181 a
further indication that New Zealand is an appropriate legal
comparator for the United States with respect to tort law.182
178. See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, FAIRNESS AND FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF TWO
OPEN SOCIETIES, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES 27, 476 (2012)
The United States and New Zealand are both open societies and have
been so for many generations. Each in its own way has a democratic
polity, a mixed-enterprise economy, a pluralist culture, a strong
commitment to human rights, and a firm belief in the rule of law. Both
of these open systems encourage individual people to make their own
choices. They also share many values in common, including liberty and
freedom, fairness and justice.
179. See infra notes 180–188 (comparing New Zealand and the United States
in various areas of the law).
180. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 187, 198 (2008) (discussing “Tort Law in America: Lessons from New
Zealand”); Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The Design of Compensation Systems: Tort
Principles Rule, O.K.?, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1115, 1119 (1995) (discussing “lessons
for American [tort-law] reformers from the New Zealand experience”); Richard S.
Miller, An Analysis and Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zealand’s Accident
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 1070, 1070 (1993) (noting continued
interest in New Zealand’s no-fault accident compensation scheme as a possible
alternative for how the United States handles personal injury torts); Craig
Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 976, 976 (1985) (exploring the role of deterrence in discussions of replacing
the U.S. tort law system with something akin to New Zealand’s no fault insurance
system); Marc A. Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the
United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27 STAN. L. REV. 653, 654 (1975)
(emphasizing that the similarities between the U.S. and New Zealand are a
reason to consider New Zealand’s experience with its new tort law system for
changing the American system).
181. Palmer, supra note 180, at 1119.
182. See id. at 1119 n.6 (listing torts casebooks that discuss New Zealand law,
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Beyond torts, American legal scholars have frequently claimed
that New Zealand’s experience holds lessons for various areas of
United States law including antitrust,183 family law,184 criminal
law,185 labor law,186 patent law,187 and many more.188

including those authored by Richard Epstein, George Christie and James Meeks,
and William Prosser).
183. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from
Antitrust and Beyond, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 128–29 (2000) (discussing lessons
for the United States to draw from New Zealand’s “advanced” antitrust law);
William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 189 (1994) (claiming that “the New Zealand experience
will have considerable relevance to the American [antitrust law in the]
telecommunications arena”).
184. See generally MARK HARDIN ET AL., FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES IN CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES: LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF NEW ZEALAND
(1996) (advocating for the application of the New Zealand family group
conferences model in U.S. family law).
185. See generally Carol A. Brook et. al., A Comparative Look at Plea
Bargaining in Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, and the United States,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1147 (2016) (comparing the nature and effects of plea
bargaining in the United States with other countries, including New Zealand).
186. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, Solidarity Forever? Unions and Bargaining
Representation Under New Zealand’s Employment Contracts Act, 18 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1995) (“In 1991, New Zealand enacted the Employment
Contracts Act (ECA), legislation that is premised on a completely different model
than U.S. labor law. It affords a rich opportunity to study the impact of some key
ideas advanced for labor law reform [in the U.S.].”).
187. See, e.g., Erin E. Block, The End of the “Wild West” for Software Patents—
Does the Patents Act 2013 Change New Zealand’s Treatment of Software Patents
from Permissive to Restrictive?, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 141, 154–56 (2015)
(comparing the patentatibility of computer programs under United States and
New Zealand law); Todd Martin, Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment:
A Comparative Study, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 381, 410 (2000) (same).
188. See, e.g., Susanna Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New
Approaches in Australia, New Zealand, and England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
101, 149–59 (2002) (comparing American defamation law with New Zealand’s);
Ruth W. Pritchard-Kelly, A Comparison Between Spectrum Auctions in the United
States and New Zealand, 20 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 155, 155 (1996) (explaining
how the U.S. learned from New Zealand’s experience in setting up an auction
system for telecommunications licensing); Michael C. Blumm, Native Fishing
Rights and Environmental Protection in North America and New Zealand: A
Comparative Analysis of Profits à Prendre and Habitat Servitudes, 8 WIS. INT’L
L.J. 1 (1989) (examining native fishing rights in America with British Columbia
and New Zealand); see also, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Comparing United States and
New Zealand Legal Education: Are U.S. Law Schools Too Good?, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 31, 32 (1997) (comparing the two nations’ legal educational
systems).
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The comparison between the two countries is especially
appropriate when it comes to securities regulation in general, and
crowdfunding in particular.189 New Zealand’s securities law is, on
the whole, a close cousin to the United States. They both rely on a
central national regulator (the SEC and the FMA) to keep close
tabs on the public securities markets (the New York Stock
Exchange, NASDAQ, et cetera, and the New Zealand Exchange
(NZX)).190 Like the United States,191 New Zealand has an extensive
history of precisely the sort of fraud and wrongdoing that securities
law is designed to combat.192 In New Zealand during the 2000s, for
instance, there was a rash of so-called “finance companies” that
sold unregistered securities to huge numbers of “mum and dad”
investors and then went bust.193 Hence both countries have an
elaborate set of mandatory disclosure rules for publicly traded
companies,194 as well as analogous exemptions from those rules,
189. See infra notes 190–200 (drawing similarities in the regulatory
construction and rules in New Zealand and the United States).
190. See generally VICTORIA STACE, ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT
REGULATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (2014) (describing securities regulation in
New Zealand).
191. See generally EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM
BARNUM TO MADOFF (2017) (tracing the prevalent history of fraud in American
businesses).
192. See STACE, ET AL., supra note 190, at 3 (“In New Zealand, a rich
jurisprudence on securities law has emerged in the wake of the GFC [(Global
Financial Crisis)] and finance company collapses, with many prominent cases
that have attracted media attention—more often for the villains than the
heroes.”).
193. See Nicola Won, Regulation of Finance Companies: Coming Out of the
Shadows, 21 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 110, 110 (2015)
The finance company collapses from 2006 onwards had a major
financial impact on New Zealand investors (and taxpayers). The
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Reserve Bank) has calculated that 45
finance companies involving over 170,000 investors (4% of the national
population; the equivalent of about 12 million Americans) failed
between 2006 and 2011, with an estimated $6 billion in outstanding
deposit liabilities.
See also Mark A. Fox et. al., Corporate Governance Research on New Zealand
Listed Companies, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1 (2012) (“[T]here has been a
rolling set of corporate failures in [New Zealand’s] finance company sector since
the global financial crisis . . . .”); id. at 4 (mentioning the “raft of finance company
failures in New Zealand”).
194. See Fox et. al., supra note 193, at 5 (suggesting that one reason for the
collapse of so many finance companies was that they were “not subject to the
discipline of the New Zealand Exchange Listing Rules” especially “the continuous
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including the commonly used accredited (“wholesale” in New
Zealand) investor exemption.195
Finally, and most relevant to the present discussion, New
Zealand expressly modeled its legal regime for crowdfunding on
the American JOBS Act.196 The New Zealand Parliament, guided
by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE),
carefully studied the JOBS Act upon its enactment in 2012,197 and
adopted a similar scheme in the Financial Markets Conduct Act of
2013.198 But as the next section will show, New Zealand’s
crowdfunding law did not follow the American model in every
respect.199 To the contrary, New Zealand’s Parliament, upon the
recommendations of MBIE, made significant changes to the JOBS
Act,200 thereby setting up a useful comparison of the two
crowdfunding laws.
disclosure regime that applies to listed companies”).
195. Compare STACE, ET AL., supra note 190, at 131 (“An offer of financial
products to a wholesale investor does not require . . . disclosure. This reflects the
generally accepted policy rationale that wholesale investors are capable of looking
after themselves, by reason of their expertise or experience in relation to financial
matters.” (citing the New Zealand Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, pts 1–9
(N.Z.))), and id. at 134 (explaining that the definition of wholesale investor
includes individuals with a net worth that exceeds NZ$5 million), with 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(a)(5) (2012) (exempting offerings of securities “solely to one or more
accredited investors”), and 17 C.F.R. § 230.215(e) (2017) (defining “accredited
investor” as including individuals with a net worth that exceeds $1 million).
196. See MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT, FINANCIAL
MARKETS CONDUCT REGULATIONS 237 (2012), http://www.mbie.govt.nz/infoservices/business/business-law/financial-markets-conduct-act/regulations/financialmarket-conduct-regulations-discussion-paper-december-2012/documentsimages-library/
Financial%20Markets%20Conduct%20Regulations%202013%20Discussion%20Paper.
pdf (“The United States has recently introduced a crowd-funding exemption from
its Securities Act, as part of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (‘JOBS
Act’) . . . . We propose [in the FMCA] to provide an [analogous] exception for
crowd-funding . . . .”); id. at 240–41 (taking note of specific portions of the JOBS
Act and discussing whether, and to what extent, New Zealand should copy the
American legal scheme for crowdfunding).
197. See id. at 240–41 (referencing the JOBS Act requirements and proposing
questions for comment based upon enacting similar requirements).
198. See Interview with James Hartley, Manager, Fin. Mkts. Policy, N.Z.
Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp’t, in Auckland, N.Z. (Apr. 4, 2017) (recounting
legislative history).
199. See infra Part III.B (describing how the American system imposes more
restrictions on the practice of crowdfunding).
200. See infra Part III.B (explaining that New Zealand consciously omitted
mandatory disclosure and investment cap provisions found in the JOBS Act).
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In sum, while New Zealand and the United States are not
precisely the same in every way, they appear to be close enough for
the present purpose, which is to provide a broad and rough
comparison of their crowdfunding laws and markets.
B. Crowdfunding Under the FMC
Once the United States enacted the JOBS Act in 2012, other
countries sought to emulate the crowdfunding provisions of Title
III.201 One of the first movers was New Zealand.202 The Parliament
there took Title III as a model for its own equity crowdfunding law,
which it passed in 2013 as part of a massive overhaul of securities
law called the Financial Markets Conduct Act (FMCA).203
Regulations were promptly issued the next year204 and the New
Zealand equity crowdfunding205 market opened for business in
2014, two years ahead of the United States.206
New Zealand’s model of crowdfunding is broadly similar to the
JOBS Act, although the New Zealand version is simpler and more

201. See Weinstein, supra note 175, at 427–49 (looking at the expansion of
crowdfunding outside the United States).
202. See Dehner & Kong, supra note 15, at 437 (observing that despite
starting their legislation after the JOBS Act, New Zealand’s laws became effective
in 2014).
203. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (documenting that New
Zealand modeled its crowdfunding law on Title III of the JOBS Act).
204. See Financial Markets Conduct Regulations, MINISTRY BUS., INNOVATION,
& EMP’T, http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/business-law/financialmarkets-conduct-act/regulations (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (“The full Financial
Markets Conduct Regulations (FMC Regulations) were made on 3 November 2014
and came into force on 1 December 2014.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
205. United States law “permits any ‘security’ to be crowdfunded” while New
Zealand allows equity securities to be crowdfunded through a “crowd funding
service” and allows debt securities to be crowdfunded through a “peer-to-peer
lending service.” Compare Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at
1482 (observing that in the U.S. system, most expect issuers to sell stock in their
companies, but other securities, such as bonds, notes, or other debt instruments,
could also be issued), with Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014, reg.
185(1) (N.Z.) (placing the focus on equity crowdfunding, because peer-to-peer
lending is predominantly used by individuals, rather than companies).
206. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (comparing the relative start
dates for the crowdfunding regulatory schemes in each nation).
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liberal (“light-handed,” as they would say)207 in that it imposes very
few restrictions on the practice.208 In the United States, Congress
included mandatory disclosure and an investment cap in the JOBS
Act to prevent investors both from fraud and from losing more than
they could afford.209 The New Zealand Parliament consciously
deleted these features from its version of equity crowdfunding.210
There are only a few hard and fast rules in New Zealand
crowdfunding. For one, all listings must be hosted by an online
“platform” licensed by the Financial Markets Authority (FMA), the
New Zealand equivalent of the SEC.211 For another, issuers may
only sell up to NZ$2 million (~$1.4 million) in equity per year
through crowdfunding.212
Beyond those few rules, New Zealand’s law is spare and
light-handed. There is no rule mandating any certain disclosures,
and the FMA does not review or approve of individual offerings.213
Rather, it is up to each private platform to decide which companies
to list on its site and what, if any, disclosure to demand from them,
without direct input or oversight from the FMA.214
207. See, e.g., Calida Smylie, Are Equity Crowdfunding Regulations too
Light-Handed?, NAT’L BUS. REV., June 12, 2017 [hereinafter Smylie,
Crowdfunding Regulations too Light-Handed?]; see also, e.g., Clear Comm’s, Ltd.
v. Telecomm. Corp. of N.Z., CP590/91, 22 Dec. 1992 (using the term in the
antitrust context).
208. See Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Limit?, supra note 123 (describing
New Zealand’s crowdfunding regime as “relatively liberal” (quoting New Zealand
government official)); Interview with Colin Magee, Head of Conduct, N.Z. Fin.
Markets Auth., in Auckland, N.Z. (Feb. 24, 2017).
209. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1461–62, 1464
(explaining these two provisions of the CROWDFUND Act).
210. Interview with James Hartley, supra note 198.
211. See Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014, reg. 186(1) (N.Z.)
(providing the eligibility requirements for licensing from the FMA for crowd
funding service providers).
212. See id. reg. 186(1)(g) (requiring service providers must have procedures
to ensure issuers do not raise more than $2 million (New Zealand dollars) per
year).
213. See Taylor Burgess & Caitlin Hollings, Legislation Note, Financial
Markets Conduct Act 2013, 20 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 290, 295 (2014) (explaining
the FMA’s exclusion of peer-to-peer lending platforms from disclosure
requirements and use of a licensing process to provide protections for the general
public).
214. See id. (noting that the FMA utilizes a licensing process for the platforms
as its main form of supervision).
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Another key difference between the crowdfunding laws in the
United States and New Zealand is that the JOBS Act imposes an
annual cap on the amount that any individual may invest through
crowdfunding.215 The precise amount depends on one’s income and
net worth, but for the average person it would work out to be about
$3,000-$5,000 in all crowdfunding companies each year, and only
slightly more for even very wealthy investors.216 An investor cap is
a standard practice in crowdfunding laws around the world—
Australia’s statute includes a cap of AU$10,000 per company,217 for
instance—and it is there to protect investors from losing more than
they can afford. New Zealand, in its light-handed way, has no
investor cap at all!218 People are free to invest as much as they wish
in as many companies as they wish.
C. Policy Goal: Efficiency (and Not Inclusivity)
New Zealand’s crowdfunding law is directed at the singular
policy goal of efficiency, and is not directly concerned with
advancing an inclusive model of entrepreneurship.219 New
Zealand’s crowdfunding law, unlike the JOBS Act, was not
intended to advance the cause of inclusive entrepreneurship.220

215. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1461 (stating
the U.S. law set limitation upon both issuers and investors).
216. The JOBS Act defines the annual investor cap for those whose annual
income or net worth is below $100,000 as the greater of $2,000 or 5% of their
annual income or net worth (10% for people with an annual income and net worth
over $100,000, up to an absolute cap of $100,000 per year). 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012). To offer an example, someone with an annual income of
$500,000 and a net worth of $5 million may legally invest up to $50,000 per year
(10% of the lesser) in all crowdfunding issuers.
217. See Corporation Amendment (Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 2017 ss
738ZC (Austl.) (setting the Australian investment cap).
218. This was a conscious departure from the model of the JOBS Act.
Interview with James Hartley, supra note 198; Interview with Hayley Buckley,
Partner, Wynn Williams, in Auckland, N.Z. (May 18, 2017).
219. Interview with Colin Magee, supra note 208; Interview with James
Hartley, supra note 198; Interview with Simeon Burnett, CEO, Snowball Effect,
in Auckland, N.Z. (Feb. 27, 2017).
220. See supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text (explaining the original
intention that the JOBs Act would open up potential investment for “anyone who
can convince the public he has a good business idea”).
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This is not because New Zealand is opposed to an inclusive
economy—if anything, the contrary is true.221
Rather, the focus on efficiency stems from the fact that the
country has long suffered from a dearth of venture capital and
angel investment,222 to the point that even highly promising
startup companies had trouble getting the capital they need to
survive and grow.223 New Zealand looked to equity crowdfunding
to serve as an efficient and significant source of early-stage finance
for promising startup companies.224 It could not afford to
potentially reduce the efficiency of the system by trying to make it
inclusive as well.
Unlike in the United States, where talented entrepreneurs
can obtain several million dollars from any of a number of
well-established VC funds and so-called angel investors,225 New
Zealand has long had a much shallower pool for early-stage capital
financing.226 Angel investors, for their part, have traditionally been
almost non-existent: The New Zealand Angel Association was not
established until 2008,227 and at the time of the FMCA, angels were
investing just NZ$30 million per year in all New Zealand

221. See, e.g., Treasury Inclusive Economy Working Group, Towards an
Inclusive Economy, (New Zealand Treasury, Working Paper 01/15, July 2001),
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2001/01-15
(“[S]et[ting] out the Treasury’s thinking on how the Government can achieve its
goal of an inclusive economy.”); cf. FISCHER, supra note 178, at 476 (“New
Zealanders are more mindful of fairness, justice, and equity [than are
Americans] . . . .”).
222. See supra notes 226–233 and accompanying text (discussing the slow
growth of angel investors and venture capitalism in New Zealand).
223. Interview with Simon Papa, Principal, Cygnus Law, in Auckland, N.Z.
(Feb. 7, 2017); Interview with Hayley Buckley, supra note 218.
224. Interview with Simon Papa, supra note 223; Interview with Hayley
Buckley, supra note 218.
225. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel
Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1419 n.57 (2008) (“In 2006, angels and venture
capitalists each invested approximately $25 billion.”).
226. See New Zealand Government, Building Capital Markets, 23 (Feb. 2013)
(“[I]t is often difficult for New Zealand businesses to raise sufficient risk capital
in our relatively thin markets.”); Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Limit?, supra note
123 (“[T]here is a hole in the capital markets.”).
227. See Our Role, ANGEL ASS’N N.Z., https://www.angelassociation.co.nz/ourrole/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (providing the start date of the organization) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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companies.228 By way of comparison, American angels were
investing over $9 billion per year at that time.229
As for venture capital, New Zealand had “no venture capital
market” at all, as recently as the late 1990s.230 In 2002, the New
Zealand government attempted to jump-start the domestic VC
industry by establishing a state-run VC fund-of-funds in 2002,
called the New Zealand Venture Investment Fund (NZVIF).231
Despite the addition of the NZVIF, New Zealand VC funds
continued to “struggl[e] to get the cash they needed to maintain
the rapid growth of the small, precocious and risky companies in
their portfolios.”232 “Then the international finance crisis hit,” and
VC “funding came to a grinding halt.”233
In 2012, the year that crowdfunding was authorized as part of
the FMCA, the lack of VC financing remained a major problem.234
As a NZVIF report from that year explained, “A major issue for
New Zealand’s capital markets is the lack of sufficient capital to
meet the needs of young high growth companies. . . . $200 million
of investment capital is needed each year to meet the existing
demand, over double what is currently available.”235 Even recently,
228. See Consolidating Angels Hold Their Own, NZ YOUNG CO. FIN., Issue 14,
Apr. 2013, at 1, http://www.angelassociation.co.nz/media/2014/04/Young_
Company_Finance_Issue_14_April_2013.pdf (providing investment information
for angel investors in New Zealand).
229. Id. at 5.
230. N.Z. VENTURE INV. FUND LTD., STATEMENT OF INTENT: 2014–2019, at 2,
https://www.nzvif.co.nz/assets/publications/Statement-of-Intent-2014.pdf;
see
also JOSH LERNER ET AL., LECG, A STUDY OF NEW ZEALAND’S VENTURE CAPITAL
MARKET AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY: TO THE MINISTRY OF RESEARCH,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 4, 63 (2005), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
5ed8/580c2f1e003da67f9c400354a51cd8b01fcb.pdf (stating that prior to 2002,
“there was a virtual absence of dedicated venture capital funds operating in New
Zealand”).
231. N.Z. VENTURE INV. FUND LTD., supra note 230, at 2.
232. Mike Booker, The State of Venture Capital in New Zealand, IDEALOG
(Jan. 30, 2009), https://idealog.co.nz/venture/2009/01/show-us-the-money (last
visited Feb. 17, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
233. Id.
234. See NZVIF, DISCUSSION PAPER: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN VENTURE
CAPITAL
AND
PRIVATE
EQUITY
IN
NEW
ZEALAND
1
(2012),
https://www.nzvif.co.nz/assets/publications/Institutional-Inv-Discussion-PaperSept12.pdf (remarking on the continued lack of institutional participation in the
venture capital and private equity markets).
235. Id.
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New Zealand’s volume of VC investment—scaled as a percentage
of GDP—is just 8% that of the United States.236
Thus, a key policy goal of the New Zealand government when
it passed the FMCA was to address the lack of early-stage
entrepreneurial finance in the country, and it decided to use equity
crowdfunding to ameliorate this problem. In its “Business Growth
Agenda Progress Report” from 2013, the government recognized
that “it is often difficult for New Zealand businesses to raise
sufficient risk-capital in our relatively thin markets,”237 and
pointed to the crowdfunding authorization in the FMCA as a way
to increase access to startup financing in an efficient manner.238 In
other statements, the government repeatedly reiterated that its
policy goal for authorizing equity crowdfunding was to encourage
efficient and effective capital raising for startups and small
businesses.239 Notably absent from these discussions was any talk
236. See OECD ENTREPRENEURSHIP AT A GLANCE 2016, at 137,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/entrepreneur_aag-2016-graph119-en (graphing venture
capital investments as a percentage of GDP); see also Smylie, Equity
Crowdfunding Limit?, supra note 123 (“Without a doubt, the capital markets
infrastructure for companies raising less than $10 million is sparse. Until the
large brokers kick in for deals of more than $10 million, there just isn’t an efficient
distribution channel to tap into the capital markets.”).
237. New Zealand Government, supra note 227, at 23.
238. See id. (“The Government’s updated securities legislation provides
explicit mechanisms for regulating new forms of intermediated capital raising,
such as . . . ‘crowd funding’. These enable funds for small businesses . . . to be
raised in internet-based market places, potentially more efficiently than through
traditional public or private offerings.”); CABINET BUS. COMM., FINANCIAL
MARKETS CONDUCT REGULATIONS PAPER 4—LICENSING REGIMES, ¶ 124, at 16,
http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/business-law/financial-marketsconduct-act/regulations/financial-market-conduct-regulations-decisions-june2013/documents-images-library/Paper%204%20-%20licensing.pdf
(“Enabling
crowd-funding was highlighted in the Government’s Business Growth Agenda as
an initiative to support early-stage and growth companies to access the
risk-capital they need to grow.”); Hayley Buckley, Exploding the Crowdfunding
Myths, NAT’L BUS. REV., Apr. 12, 2014 (observing that the crowdfunding provision
in the FMCA responds to the “significant gap in the market for companies looking
to raise funds”).
239. See Press Release, Craig Foss, N.Z. Commerce Minister, Foss Welcomes
First Crowd-funding License (July 31, 2014) (“New Zealand needs more
innovative businesses to increase economic growth—[equity crowdfunding] is one
way for early-stage and growth companies to source the risk capital they need to
flourish. . . . [Equity crowdfunding is] part of the Government’s Business Growth
Agenda to build New Zealand’s capital markets and drive business growth,
exports and jobs . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
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of how crowdfunding could be an inclusive form of startup finance.
Rather, the focus was entirely on efficiency and addressing the
insufficient funding from VCs and angel investors.
Finally, New Zealand’s focus on efficiency rather than
inclusivity is directly expressed in the FMCA’s statement of
purpose, found in Sections 3 and 4 of that statute.240 The word and
concept of inclusivity is nowhere to be found in those Sections;
rather, the emphasis is on efficient capital raising in order to
promote economic growth.241 In sum, the policy goal behind New
Zealand’s authorization of equity crowdfunding in the FMCA was
efficiency: The government sought to generate a helpful new source
of venture finance for promising startup companies.242
also Press Release, Craig Foss, N.Z. Commerce Minister, NZ Financial Markets
Enter New Era, (Apr. 1, 2014) (“Today’s changes [including equity crowdfunding]
will support confident and informed participation by businesses, investors and
consumers in New Zealand’s financial markets. It is important that we have clear
rules for companies wishing to raise capital . . . .”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); CABINET BUS. COMM., FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT
REGULATIONS PAPER 1: OVERVIEW, at 2, ¶ 11, http://www.mbie.govt.nz/infoservices/business/business-law/financial-markets-conduct-act/regulations/
financial-market-conduct-regulations-decisions-june-2013/documents-imageslibrary/Paper%201%20-%20overview.pdf (explaining that the FMCA seeks to
“promot[e] innovation and new sources of capital . . . by providing
for . . . crowd-funding platforms”).
240. See New Zealand Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, pt 1, s 3 (N.Z.)
(“The main purposes of this Act are to—(a) promote the confident and informed
participation of businesses, investors, and consumers in the financial markets;
and (b) promote and facilitate the development of fair, efficient, and transparent
financial markets.”); id. s 4.
This Act has the following additional purposes: (a) to provide for timely,
accurate, and understandable information to be provided to persons to assist
those persons to make decisions relating to financial products or the provision of
financial services: (b) to ensure that appropriate governance arrangements apply
to financial products and certain financial services that allow for effective
monitoring and reduce governance risks: (c) to avoid unnecessary compliance
costs: (d) to promote innovation and flexibility in the financial markets.
241. See Thomas Gibbons, Purpose and Principles of Securities Regulation
11–12, 16 (interpreting the FMCA statement of purpose as “emphasi[zing] capital
raising and economic growth” because “[s]ound financial markets—productive,
successful financial markets—have the potential to be of significant benefit to the
New Zealand economy”), in FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT REGULATION: A
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 190.
242. But cf. FISCHER, supra note 178, at 476 (“Americans think of an open
society as a free society, centered primarily on the values of liberty and freedom
that are deeply rooted in American history. New Zealanders are more mindful of
fairness, justice, and equity, which have long been an important part of their
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IV. Efficient Versus Inclusive Crowdfunding: A Comparative
Analysis of New Zealand and the United States
From the outset, New Zealand sought to establish an efficient
market for crowdfunding, while the United States tried to create a
crowdfunding market that was both efficient and inclusive. New
Zealand deputized crowdfunding platforms to act as gatekeepers
in order to protect investors from investing in companies that were
either fraudulent or unlikely to succeed. But the United States, at
least initially, envisioned a system where platforms would be
passive entities required by law to allow any and every
entrepreneur onto their site. Without an active gatekeeper on
duty, Congress reasonably concluded that it had better demand
significant mandatory disclosure and other regulations in order to
protect investors. Of course, the SEC did ultimately empower
platforms to act as gatekeepers, but that was years later and
during the regulatory process.243 The unhappy result is that
although the SEC tried to downgrade inclusivity in an attempt to
enhance efficiency, the inefficiencies were already baked into the
statute.
A. Crowdfunding in New Zealand is More Efficient but Less
Inclusive
With its laser-like focus on efficiency, New Zealand has
created a crowdfunding market that is much more financially
successful than its counterpart in the United States. This Section
reports on the results of the New Zealand crowdfunding market,
and compares those results with both the American crowdfunding
experience as well as New Zealand venture capital and angel
investment.244 As will appear, the New Zealand model has turned
out to be rather efficient, generating a relatively large amount of
startup capital and avoiding fraud, and is handily outpacing the
United States in economic terms.245
experience.”).
243. Supra Part I.D.
244. See infra Sections III.A.1–4 (providing statistical comparisons of the New
Zealand and U.S. crowdsourcing platforms).
245. See John Anthony, New Zealand crowdfunding platforms gearing up for
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The data in this Section is based on the first year of equity
crowdfunding in New Zealand, which ran from mid-2014 through
mid-2015.246 Although New Zealand has been conducting
crowdfunding for over three years, the focus here is on the first
year so as to allow a comparison with the United States, which has
only one year of experience.247 In addition, the second year of New
Zealand equity crowdfunding had similar results as the first.248
In the first year of equity crowdfunding in New Zealand, there
were 27 crowdfunding campaigns in total, 21 of which were
successful, representing a 78% success rate.249 Those 21 successful
campaigns raised a cumulative total of NZ$12 million (US$10
million).250 The average successful raise was NZ$590,000
(US$470,000), and two campaigns reached the legal limit of NZ$2

big 2016, STUFF, http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/75424341/newzealand-crowdfunding-platforms-gearing-up-for-big-2016 (last updated Jan. 24,
2016) (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (quoting Simeon Burnett, CEO of Snowball
Effect, describing equity crowdfunding as “really efficient”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
246. See New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding 1st Year in Review, CROWDREADY
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.crowdready.com.au/news-1/2015/8/new-zealandequity-crowdfunding-1st-year-in-review (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) [hereinafter 1st
Year in Review] (reporting on the first year of equity crowdfunding in New
Zealand, which commenced when the first licenses were issued on July 30, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
247. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION CROWDFUNDING: A
SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR ISSUERS (2016) (noting that American
crowdfunding commenced on May 16, 2016).
248. See Calida Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Numbers Slump After First
Year, NAT’L BUS. REV. (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/equitycrowdfunding-numbers-slump-after-first-year-cs-p-196346 [hereinafter Smylie,
Crowdfunding Numbers Slump] (“New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market
has just completed its second full year and, on the face of it, the numbers look a
little flat.”); New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding 2nd Year in Review,
CROWDREADY (Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.crowdready.com.au/news-1/2016/10/nzequity-crowdfunding-2nd-year-in-review (last visited Jan. 2, 2018) [hereinafter
2nd Year in Review] (reporting on New Zealand’s second year of crowdfunding)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
249. See 1st Year in Review, supra note 246 (discussing that the results were
very positive given the historic difficulty in raising capital).
250. See id. (noting the amount raised in over twenty-one New Zealand
companies). The currency conversions in this Section are based on a 0.8
conversion rate between US and NZ dollars, which was the approximate rate at
the time in question (2014–2015), and are rounded for the sake of simplicity.
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million.251 Technology, consumer products and food and beverages
were the most popular industries.252
These numbers, while seemingly modest, are significant when
compared to the traditional forms of startup finance in New
Zealand, namely VC and angel investors. In 2014, which was the
year crowdfunding commenced, New Zealand angels invested
NZ$56 million in 118 deals—a record high.253 New Zealand
venture capital funds contributed almost precisely the same
amount that year, NZ$56 million in total, spread across 62
investments.254 Equity crowdfunding’s total of NZ$12 million over
21 investments represent a significant contribution of
entrepreneurial capital for New Zealand startup companies.255
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market is even more
impressive when compared to its counterpart in the United States.
In its first year of operation, from mid-2016 to mid-2017, there
were 211 crowdfunding campaigns in the United States, 112 of
which were successful, representing a 53% success rate.256 Those
112 successful campaigns raised a cumulative total of about $35
million.257 The average successful raise was about $300,000, and
nine campaigns reached the legal limit of $1 million.258 Similar to

251. See id. (stating that six other companies reached their own lower,
self-imposed maximum targets).
252. See id. (“Industry wise, the technology companies represented the most
number of campaigns with 43% whilst the food/beverage raised the most money
in New Zealand with $3.8 million despite only 17% of campaigns being companies
in this industry.”).
253. See N.Z. MINISTRY OF BUS. INNOVATION & EMP’T, BUSINESS GROWTH
AGENDA: BUILDING INVESTMENT 2 (2015) (noting strong activity in early-stage
capital markets).
254. See N.Z. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, NEW ZEALAND
PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL MONITOR: 2014 FULL YEAR REVIEW 7 (2014)
(detailing venture and early stage investment).
255. See id. at 8 (charting early stage investments by sector).
256. CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS,
http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/cca-reg-cf-index/ (focusing on Charts 1 and 3
as of May 15, 2017, one year after crowdfunding commenced in the United States)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
257. See CCLEAR Dashboard, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS (July 28, 2016),
http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/cclear_public (last visited Jan. 10, 2018)
(reporting a total of about $35 million) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
258. See id. (noting the average campaign success).
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New Zealand, technology and food and beverages were among the
most popular industries.259
When comparing New Zealand and American crowdfunding,
one must account for the fact that the American economy is about
100 times as large as that of New Zealand.260 If we scale the New
Zealand crowdfunding numbers up by a factor of 100, then the
number of campaigns would have been 2,700 (2,100 of which were
successful), and the successful campaigns would have raised a
total of US$1 billion.261 Recall that the United States had only 211
campaigns (112 successful ones), raising a total of $35 million.262
In other words, scaled for the size of its economy, New Zealand had
about thirteen times as many campaigns as the United States; New
Zealand companies had a success rate of nearly 80%, compared to
the American rate of about 50%; and New Zealand issuers raised
about thirty times as much money as did their American
counterparts.263 These numbers are remarkable.
Furthermore, in the brief history of New Zealand
crowdfunding, not a single funded company was revealed to be a
fraud, and there has been just one liquidation.264 Now, this time
period is relatively brief, and the overall New Zealand economy has
been strong over those three years, so these aspects of the results
must be taken with a grain of salt. Fraud and poor business
performance could be occurring at crowdfunded companies and we

259. See 1st Year in Review, supra note 246 (outlining New Zealand’s most
successful crowdfunding industries).
260. See WORLD BANK, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT RANKING 1 (2016) (reporting
that the United States has the largest GDP while New Zealand has the fifty-first
largest GDP). In U.S. dollars, the GDP of the United States is about $18 trillion
and the GDP of New Zealand is about $184 billion.
261. See id. (noting the significant difference between the size of the two
economies).
262. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing the first year U.S.
crowdfunding campaigns).
263. See supra notes 248–262 (outlining New Zealand’s crowdfunding
statistics).
264. See Interview with Colin Magee, supra note 209; Paul McBeth, Balex
Marine, Snowball Crowdfunder Participant, Sunk by High Costs, Slow Sales,
NAT’L BUS. REV. (May 17, 2017), https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/balex-marinesnowball-crowdfunder-participant-sunk-high-costs-slow-sales-b-203033
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2018) (reporting on the first crowdfunding company to liquidate)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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would not necessarily know about it.265 It also bears noting that
dividends are practically nonexistent among New Zealand
crowdfunded companies, and that we have yet to see any IPOs or
other sort of remunerative “exit” for the investors.266
At the same time, zero instances of fraud after three years is
a record that New Zealand should be proud of. In other countries
with active equity crowdfunding markets, fraud has revealed itself
fairly promptly,267 but this has not happened in New Zealand.
Thus, it remains impressive for New Zealand crowdfunding to
have generated a perfect record regarding fraud, and a
near-perfect record regarding business failures, to date.
In sum, New Zealand set out to create a highly efficient system
of equity crowdfunding that would funnel capital to promising
startups that need it.268 It was not distracted by any other policy
goals, most notably inclusivity.269 And the data presented in this
Section show that New Zealand has largely succeeded in achieving
its singular goal of creating an efficient market for equity
crowdfunding.270
How did New Zealand generate such an efficient equity
crowdfunding market? First, New Zealand’s law and regulations
are liberal and simple, thus imposing much lower compliance costs
than the JOBS Act and related regulations.271 Second, and more
265. See Nathaniel Popper, Doubts Arise as Investors Flock to Crowdfunded
Start-Ups, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/
business/dealbook/crowdfunding-fraud-investing-startups.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2018) (noting that fraud found in crowdfunding may be easily overlooked
by investors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
266. See Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, CROWDSPHERE,
https://crowdsphere.co.nz/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2018) (detailing risks of
investment including illiquidity, lack of dividends, loss of investment and
dilution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
267. See, e.g., James T. Areddy, Chinese Pile On Risk, One Swipe at a Time,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2017, at A1 (describing investigations into fraud and sharp
dealing in the China crowdfunding industry).
268. See supra Part II.A (comparing New Zealand’s crowdsourcing strategy to
United States crowdfunding).
269. See supra Part II.C (outlining New Zealand’s policy goal of efficiency over
inclusivity).
270. See infra Part III.A.1–4 (providing statistics on the efficiency of New
Zealand’s system).
271. See supra Part I.B (discussing compliance costs under the U.S.
crowdfunding policies).
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importantly for present purposes, New Zealand’s crowdfunding
system depends on private actors to organize the market, keep it
honest, and make it work well, all without direct participation on
the part of the government.272 As expected, market participants
have indeed established numerous effective modes of private
ordering or private governance, including “gatekeepers,”
“syndication,” “pre-existing crowds,” and “reputation.”273 As will be
seen, these techniques have the side effect of diminishing
entrepreneurial inclusivity, which is not a problem in New
Zealand, but it may be in the United States.
1. Gatekeepers
New Zealand’s law envisions that the licensed crowdfunding
platforms would act as strict “gatekeepers” and only allow
legitimate and promising companies to access the crowd. The
model is one of market-based incentives, rather than regulatory
commands.274 Platforms have a self-interest in establishing and
maintaining an online reputation as a reliable place for investors
to put their money.275 If they allow fraudulent or low-quality
companies onto their site, and investors lose their money, the
investors will not come back and the platform will go out of
business.276 Knowing all this, platforms can be expected to only
invite legitimate and sound companies to participate on their

272. See generally Schwartz, Crowdfunding in New Zealand, supra note 18.
273. See infra Part III.A.1–4 (outlining critical elements of New Zealand’s
crowdfunding program).
274. See Mackenzie McCarty, Cabinet Gives Green Light to Equity
Crowdfunding, N.Z. LAW (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nz/
news/cabinet-gives-green-light-to-equity-crowdfunding-184672.aspx (last visited
Feb. 17, 2018) (noting that the system incentivizes crowdfunding platforms to
have reputable companies to avoid failures) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
275. See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 219 (describing
reputation as a driver).
276. See McCarty, supra note 274 (quoting Hayley Buckley as saying,
“[i]t’s . . . really going to be quite self-fulfilling, because the platform will be
incentivised to have the best companies—they really don’t want any failures on
their platforms. And that’s aligning them absolutely with the interests of
investors”).
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site.277 The platform’s gatekeeping role thus protects investors and
gives them the confidence to participate in the market.278
This gatekeeper model may well be an efficient system, and
the results discussed above suggest it is, but it is plainly not
inclusive. The effect is that entrepreneurs are not allowed to go
directly to the crowd and solicit funds; rather, they do have to
impress the platform’s management to get their chance to
crowdfund.279 This is the polar opposite of the inclusive vision
found in reward crowdfunding and the original version of SEC
Rule 402(b)(1), where entrepreneurs would go straight to the crowd
and it would decide whom to support.280
In practice, New Zealand platforms take their gatekeeper role
seriously and are very selective in deciding which companies to
allow to list on their site.281 They understand perfectly well how
vital it is to protect their reputation and accordingly exclude
companies that are unlikely to succeed, or that have any chance of
being fraudulent. Snowball Effect, for instance, lists only 2% of the
hundreds of companies that want to crowdfund on their site,
“mostly because they’re not investment ready.”282 The platform is
selective because, according to the company, “we’ve got our own
reputation [to protect and because] we want investors to get what

277. See id. (discussing the strict licensing process).
278. See id. (“It’s [also] really going to be quite self-fulfilling, because the
platform will be incentivised to have the best companies—they really don’t want
any failures on their platforms. And that’s aligning them absolutely with the
interests of investors.” (quoting Hayley Buckley)); Interview with Hayley
Buckley, supra note 218.
279. See Josh Daniell, Do We Still Call it Equity Crowdfunding?, SNOWBALL
EFFECT (Oct. 6, 2016), https://nzbusiness.co.nz/article/do-we-still-call-it-equitycrowdfunding (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (discussing the process for connecting
investors and companies) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
280. See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text (detailing that funding
portals were originally almost completely passive entities and could not
subjectively screen crowdfunding offers).
281. See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 219 (discussing the
rigorous listing requirements).
282. See Smylie, Crowdfunding Regulations too Light-Handed?, supra note
207 (“98% of companies we point in another direction.”) (quoting Snowball Effect
co-founder, Josh Daniell); Anthony, supra note 245 (“Snowball Effect had been
approached by hundreds of companies wanting to crowdfund but it was selective
about which were chosen for the platform.”).
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we think are interesting opportunities that are ready for public
investment.”283
This focus on selectivity, rather than inclusivity, is not unique
to Snowball Effect, but is rather standard practice in the
industry.284 A founder of another equity crowdfunding platform
was quoted as saying, “I think everyone’s being really selective
about what offers they’re putting in the market to make sure there
is a higher probability of success.”285 This line of thinking has been
criticized by some, including the founder of yet another platform,
who wished that New Zealand would have embraced a more
inclusive model: “The only way to maintain a high success rate is
for the platform to cherry-pick offers they think will succeed. If
that’s the case, then really you are just mirroring the current
finance models—entrepreneurs end up convincing an individual
gatekeeper, not testing their idea on the crowd.”286
A seeming exception to the general practice is found in
PledgeMe, an equity crowdfunding platform that tries to be
inclusive and “welcomes all businesses to use its platform”: “We
don’t tell people that they can’t crowdfund but we definitely give
them feedback on areas they might want to look at before they go
live.”287 However, even PledgeMe screens companies that ask to
list on the site by putting each one through a multi-week
one-on-one course called “Crowdfunding U[niversity]” before
allowing them to use the site.288 Given that nearly half of the
283. See Anthony, supra note 245 (“We need to make sure that companies are
suitable for our offering and a lot of companies aren’t.” (quoting Snowball Effect
co-founder Josh Daniell)).
284. See Nathan Rose & Josh Daniell, Angel Investors Join the Crowd,
ASSEMBLE ADVISORY (“Each equity crowdfunding marketplace [in New Zealand]
is ‘curated’ or ‘vetted’ to some extent.”).
285. See Brendan Manning, Riding the New Wave of Equity Raising, N.Z.
HERALD, July 23, 2015 (quoting David Wallace, founder of the Crowdcube equity
crowdfunding platform).
286. See Calida Smylie, Younger Crowdfunding Platforms Fail to Gain
Traction, NAT’L BUS. REV. (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/youngercrowdfunding-platforms-fail-gain-traction-cs-p-179663 (quoting Adam Hunt,
founder of the Liftoff equity crowdfunding platform); Interview with Adam Hunt,
Founder, Liftoff, in Auckland, N.Z. (Apr. 7, 2017).
287. Anthony, supra note 245; see generally also Interview of Anna Guenther,
CEO, PledgeMe, in Wellington, N.Z. (June 19, 2017); Interview of Barry Grehan,
Chief Lending Officer, PledgeMe, in Auckland, N.Z. (Feb. 24, 2017).
288. See Crowdfunding University, PLEDGEME, http://guide.pledgeme.co.nz/
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companies drop out before completing the course,289 this acts as an
effective way to separate the wheat from the chaff.
In sum, rather than allowing every entrepreneur to “have a
go,” the platforms act as strict gatekeepers that only allow a select
few to access the crowd.290 This is efficient, but not inclusive, from
the perspective of an entrepreneur.
2. Syndication
Syndication is where the crowd invests alongside a large and
sophisticated “lead” investor, and is a method borrowed directly
from angel investors.291 Under this model, one “active” or “lead”
angel, presumably an expert in the relevant industry, researches
a company and the proposed terms of investment, and then reports
back to the rest of the angels in the group.292 The other angels in
the group play a “passive” role; they trust in the expertise and
diligence of the lead angel.293
The distinctive legal regime in New Zealand has allowed for
syndication to develop as a key method for privately regulating its
equity crowdfunding market. Unlike the United States (as well as
practically every other country), New Zealand’s crowdfunding law
imposes no cap on the amount an investor may contribute.294 This
was a conscious decision on the part of the government and
specifically designed, at least in part, to facilitate large

crowdfundingu (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (detailing the site’s training program
for new companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
289. Interview with Barry Grehan, supra note 287.
290. See supra notes 282–289 and accompanying text (noting that the
selectivity is a defining feature of the system).
291. See Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future is
Here, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 542 (2015) (“The syndicates shadow trade, as
coinvestors, on the trades of ‘lead angels’ or ‘angel advisers.’”).
292. See id. at 542–43 (“[T]he angel takes the lead in identifying the
investment opportunity and negotiating the terms on behalf of their syndicate.”).
293. See id. at 543 (noting that passive investors are able to observe and follow
in the angels’ lead).
294. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (stating that the U.S. puts a
cap on the investment to prevent investors from risking more than they can
afford).
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investments by lead investors and syndication by the rest of the
crowd—just like in traditional angel investing.295
Hence under New Zealand law an angel investor is legally
permitted to invest hundreds of thousands through a
crowdfunding campaign, making it cost-effective to undertake the
burden of acting as a lead investor.296 The lead investor often
makes a very sizable investment herself, sometimes as much as
$500,000 at a time.297 Such an amount would be unlawful under
American law, but it is perfectly legal in New Zealand. In practice,
lead investors have become a very important component of the
equity crowdfunding marketplace.298 Like in an angel group, the
lead investor conducts research on the company and the rest of the
crowd comes along for the ride. Professional investors, including
angels and VCs, sometimes play the role of cornerstone investor.299
They serve to lend credibility to an offer; others take the fact that
someone has bought a large block of shares as a signal that the
company is sound and the valuation is fair.300 Commonly, a lead
investor will arrange in advance to contribute a large sum to a
crowdfunding campaign, thus providing it with momentum from
the first day.
The experience in New Zealand shows that lead or cornerstone
investors have become an important component of the
crowdfunding marketplace.301 As the market has matured, and the
295. See Interview with James Hartley, supra note 198 (noting the
similarities to angel investing).
296. See Oesterle, supra note 291, at 543 (“The lead angels’ or angel advisers’
economic incentive to participate is a form of carried interest, a slice of the profits
of the syndicate returns.”).
297. Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 219.
298. Id.
299. See Smylie, Crowdfunding Numbers Slump, supra note 248 (describing
“at least four campaigns [as] being partially led by a professional investor”);
Manning, supra note 285 (“We’re seeing some angels and VCs integrating equity
crowdfunding as a step in their investment strategy.”).
300. See Shaun Edlin, Pre-arranged Capital and Momentum: Is Real Money
Being Raised Through Online Marketplaces?, SNOWBALL EFFECT (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/blog/lessons-weve-learnt-about-momentum
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that a lead investor helps validate the offer
price) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally Interview
with Simeon Burnett, supra note 219.
301. See Edlin, supra note 300
We encourage companies raising through Snowball to seek a credible
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importance of cornerstone investors has become clearer, the
average number of investors in successful campaigns dropped from
152 in the first year to 82 in the second year, and the average
investment amount increased 65%.302 A knowledgeable observer
explained this change as a direct consequence of the participation
of cornerstone investors contributing NZ$100,000 to NZ$400,000
to a single campaign.303
In the United States, syndication is not a viable model for
crowdfunding due to the structure of the securities crowdfunding
law in place there. The JOBS Act places a low legal limit on the
total amount that a person may invest in all crowdfunding
companies each year.304 The upshot is that most Americans are
limited to about $3,000–$5,000 per year or less—and this amount
is not per investment, but rather per year—making it economically
infeasible for any one person to take on the role of lead investor.305
The investor cap is simply too low to make it worthwhile for a lead
angel to spend the time and effort it takes to find an appropriate
investment and conduct adequate due diligence.
On the whole, cornerstone investors are an important
component of the New Zealand equity crowdfunding market. Their
presence is a significant factor in whether an offer will succeed in
investor to lead their offer. . . . To date, only three offers through our
marketplace have failed to reach their minimum investment target.
[T]he one thing all three offers had in common was that they lacked a
credible lead investor for the round.
See also Interview with Hayley Buckley, supra note 218.
302. See Smylie, Crowdfunding Numbers Slump, supra note 248 (noting that
the average investment amount increased 65%).
303. See id. (emphasizing the impact of the presence of a professional
investor).
304. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (stating that the average limit
does not exceed $5,000).
305. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (placing limits on amounts sold to investors
per year). The JOBS Act defines the annual investor cap as 5% of the lesser of
one’s annual income or net worth (10% for people with an annual income and net
worth over $100,000, up to an absolute cap of $100,000). Id. Thus, even a wealthy
person of the sort who might act as an angel investor would be legally barred from
making large investments via crowdfunding. Someone with an annual income of
$400,000 and a net worth of $25 million may only legally invest $40,000 per year
(10% of the lesser) in all crowdfunding companies. Even someone with an annual
income of $5 million and a net worth of $1 billion may only invest $100,000 (the
cap) each year. The effect is that wealthy investors effectively cannot participate
in crowdfunding in the manner that they would in a traditional angel group.
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reaching its financing goal, both because they contribute a large
sum and because they encourage other investors to participate.306
In this way, they have greatly enhanced the New Zealand equity
crowdfunding market’s efficiency and ability of companies to get
funded.
The importance of finding a cornerstone investor, however,
makes New Zealand crowdfunding more exclusive than it would
otherwise be. All else being equal, platforms are more likely to list
a company if it already has a cornerstone investor lined up and
ready to contribute, and less likely if the company lacks such an
investor.307 New Zealand’s market has thus evolved in a manner
that makes it more difficult for those who have trouble finding
traditional investors to get their chance to impress the crowd. In
other words, while syndication does seem to enhance efficiency, it
does so at the cost of inclusivity.
3. Pre-Existing Crowds
The crowdfunding law enacted in the United States expressly
prohibits a company from directly advertising their crowdfund
offering to potential investors.308 The apparent rationale for the
bar on advertising was that Congress wanted people to make their
investing decisions based on the full disclosures mandated under
the law, and feared that advertisements might not include all of
the required information.309 Thus the law does allow issuers to
direct investors to the online funding platform, where they would
find the full set of mandated disclosures.310 The SEC’s regulations
implemented this portion of the JOBS Act by providing that
issuers may publish simple, textual “tombstone ads” that include
306. See supra notes 282–59 (outlining the benefits of having lead investors).
307. See supra notes 301–306 and accompanying text (discussing how New
Zealand platforms are more selective when choosing companies to offer to
investors).
308. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(2) (“[A]n issuer who offers or sells securities [via
crowdfunding] shall . . . not advertise the terms of the offering, except for notices
which direct investors to the funding portal or broker.”).
309. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1464 (listing
the information that issuers are required to provide).
310. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(2) (prohibiting any advertising other than
notices directing investors to the funding portal).
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only the terms of the offering and “direct an investor to the
intermediary’s platform through which the offering is being
conducted, such as through a link.”311
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding law, in contrast, has no
prohibition or limitation on advertising.312 Rather, the law allows
an issuer to advertise, promote and market its offering as it sees
fit.313 This is an important feature of the FMCA, since it enables
crowdfunding companies to “activate” their pre-existing crowd of
supporters, such as customers or previous investors, to participate
in the offering. This is an effective way to jumpstart a
crowdfunding campaign and generate momentum off the bat,
which as discussed above is vital to successfully reaching the
all-or-nothing target.314 In other words—and this is hardly
surprising—by advertising its offering to its supporters, a
crowdfunding issuer increases its likelihood of success.
But all of this depends on a company actually having a
pre-existing crowd of supporters ready to invest. What about a
brand-new startup company with no product, no customers and no
ready-made crowd? Those sorts of issuers are much less likely to
generate the early momentum needed to reach the all-or-nothing
target.315 And because they are unlikely to succeed, the gatekeeper
platforms are unlikely to want them on their site. Thus the effect
of the FMCA’s permission to advertise is to help established
companies succeed in their crowdfunding campaigns, and to
marginalize those that lack a pre-existing group of supporters.316
By allowing flashy and exciting advertising and other forms of
marketing, the New Zealand system enhances efficiency by
increasing the success rate of crowdfunding campaigns.317 At the
311. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.204 (2016) (regulating advertising that offerors may
issue).
312. See supra Part II.B (emphasizing that the FMCA is simpler than the
JOBS Act).
313. See Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 st 89–94 (N.Z.) (providing
advertising regulations for offers).
314. See supra notes 317–92 (noting strategies to initiate campaign
momentum to create successful crowdfunding).
315. See infra notes 325–93 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of a strong initial campaign launch).
316. See supra Part II.B (discussing that the FMCA gives crowdfunding
companies great autonomy in conducting offers and advertising).
317. See James Murray, Equity Crowdfunding and Peer-to-Peer Lending in
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same time, it also has the effect of excluding entrepreneurs who
are out-of-the-loop and who lack connections—the precise group
that crowdfunding was originally intended to include.318
Consistent with the FMCA’s authorization of advertising, New
Zealand equity crowdfunding platforms prefer to list companies
that already have a strong network or following, such as customers
or prior investors.319 This enhances efficiency, but is not inclusive
in the sense originally advanced in reward crowdfunding and in
the SEC’s preliminary version of Rule 402(b)(1).320 To the contrary,
it excludes those sorts of entrepreneurs who lack connections and
access, those who have not yet tasted success—precisely the group
that was crowdfunding originally intended to help.
Experience in New Zealand and elsewhere shows that
momentum is key to a successful crowdfunding campaign.321 Thus
to generate that momentum, market participants all agree that it
is vital for a campaign to have a pre-arranged set of investors
“ready to pledge in the first few hours the campaign is live.”322 In
the colorful words of one commenter, “Launching an online equity
offer is like making a movie: everything depends on
pre-production. If your offer doesn’t explode as soon as it goes live,
it’s probably going to limp to the finish line, or die trying. This
means you need to build the buzz before your offer is even live.”323
Thus at Snowball Effect, for instance, “an average of 15.8% of all

New Zealand: The First Year, 2 JASSA FINSIA J. APPLIED FIN. 1, 7 (2015)
(detailing numerous campaigns experiencing high success rates).
318. See supra Part I.C.2 (emphasizing that crowdfunding is supposed to give
everyone the opportunity to try to raise capital).
319. Interview of Anna Guenther, supra note 288.
320. See supra notes 226–39 (describing the initial proposal as radically
inclusive).
321. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing how investors
lend credibility to an offer).
322. See Promoting 101, PLEDGEME, http://guide.pledgeme.co.nz/promo-1/
(last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (noting how to organize a “cornerstone crowd” on social
media) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
323. Steven Male, Ultimate Guide to Marketing Your Equity Crowdfunding
Offer, SNOWBALL EFFECT (May 21, 2015), https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/blog/
ultimate-guide-to-marketing-your-equity-crowdfunding-offer (last visited Jan. 8,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

940

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885 (2018)

investment . . . has been pre-arranged before each offer has gone
live.”324
The only way to generate this sort of ready-to-go interest
(apart from cornerstone investors) is if the issuer already has a
pre-existing crowd of supporters that are willing to invest and
spread the word.325 The platforms count on the issuers to “activate”
their crowd.326 For example, Invivo Wines, the first company to hit
the NZ$2 million crowdfunding limit, had pledges of over NZ
$770,000 already in place at the start of the crowdfunding
campaign.327 The model relied heavily on the company as opposed
“If
you
look
to
the
platform
to
raise
funds.328
at . . . Invivo . . . they’re going to the market with 20,000 plus
followers on Facebook and they’re who they’re activating for the
funding. . . . Those sorts of networks are really important for the
process to work.”329 Another similar example can be found in
Yeastie Boys, a craft brewer, which raised NZ$500,000 “in half an
hour following an active social media campaign and investor
information sessions to promote the offer.”330 More generally, an
executive at PledgeMe estimates that about 75% of investors in a
given offering have some sort of pre-existing connection to the
company.331
The effect of the need for a pre-existing network is that a
324. Edlin, supra note 300.
325. See Promoting 101, supra note 322 (providing guidance for advertising
crowdfunding campaigns on social media) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also id.
Your First 50 are your champions! Get them ready to pledge in the first
few hours the campaign is live. Ask them to share the fact they’ve
pledged with their networks. Get them to write a blog post for you
about why they pledged and what they hope for your company. Get
them working for you.
326. See id. (advising how to engage individuals on social media to advertise
for a campaign).
327. See Murray, supra note 317, at 7 (demonstrating the largest equity
campaign in New Zealand).
328. See Manning, supra note 285 (noting the strategies of highly successful
crowdfunding companies).
329. See id. (quoting David Wallace, founder of a New Zealand equity
crowdfunding platform).
330. Murray, supra note 317, at 7.
331. See Interview with Barry Grehan, supra note 287 (discussing the
composition of investors in a typical offering).

THE GATEKEEPERS OF CROWDFUNDING

941

company without one is unlikely to reach its financial target and
thus unlikely to be accepted onto a platform in the first place.
Unless you have “an established business,” “customers,” and “a
large network of people who are ready and waiting to spread your
message,” you are probably going to be screened out by the
gatekeeper platforms.332 This is great for efficiency, as it is most
efficient to list only companies that are likely to succeed, but it
fosters an exclusive, not an inclusive, crowdfunding market.333
4. Reputation
Individual entrepreneurs have their own reputations to
consider when they launch a crowdfunding campaign. Because
New Zealand is a small country (about the size and population of
a single state), personal connections are never too tenuous—and
the Internet never forgets. If an entrepreneur were to be caught
deceiving the public in her crowdfund listing, her reputation would
be forever marred, with evidence of the wrongdoing etched in
permanent digital form on Facebook and elsewhere. A similar fate
would befall someone who squandered the money she collected
through crowdfunding, whether through shirking or malfeasance.
Knowing all this, crowdfunding entrepreneurs in New Zealand
can be expected to behave themselves both during their campaign
and once they have received the money. This seems to happen in
practice, as there has never been a single funded company that
turned out to be a fraud, and only one company has gone out of
business, since New Zealand began crowdfunding in 2014.334
At the same time, the importance of reputation is contrary to
a desire for inclusivity. In the United States, at least,
crowdfunding was envisioned as a way for unknown
entrepreneurs, meaning those without a reputation in the funding
community, to pitch their idea directly to the public.335 But the
332. See Male, supra note 323 (discussing marketing strategies for
crowdfunding offers).
333. See id. (outlining marketing methods to make crowdfunding offers feels
exclusive).
334. See supra notes 267–33 (noting the remarkable absence of fraud in New
Zealand’s crowdfunding campaigns).
335. See supra notes 226–39 (discussing that the U.S. system creates very
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New Zealand system benefits entrepreneurs with strong
reputations and punishes those with weak reputations, which is
contrary to the inclusive ideal.
B. Crowdfunding in the United States is Less Efficient but More
Inclusive
Crowdfunding in the United States is less efficient and much
smaller than in New Zealand, as detailed in the last Section.336 One
probable cause of this relative paucity of interest on the part of
entrepreneurs is the high cost of conducting a crowdfunding
offering in the United States.337 When an issuer is limited to
raising only $1 million, it is vital to keep costs very low. In New
Zealand, the law and regulations are liberal and simple, thus
imposing much lower compliance costs than the JOBS Act and
related regulations.338 In the United States, compliance costs are
so high that they prevent many issuers from conducting a
crowdfund offering that makes economic sense.339 If it costs
$40,000 to raise $100,000 through crowdfunding, many companies
few, if any, obstacles for entrepreneurs).
336. See supra Part III.A (providing an overview of the differences in
efficiency between crowdfunding in New Zealand and the U.S.).
337. See Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory
Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 284–85 (2014)
[The regulatory burden of complying with Title III of the JOBS Act]
will translate into higher legal and accounting fees, higher premiums
on directors and officers liability insurance (“D&O insurance”), and
higher intermediation fees. For a capital raise of $1 million (which is
the maximum in retail crowdfunding), the SEC roughly estimates a
cost of up to $152,260, which may be an underestimation. This could
be prohibitively expensive for many small issuers.
See also Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 83, at 1605 (commenting on the
“costly set of responsibilities” imposed by Title III of the JOBS Act).
338. See Henry William Hillind, Exploiting the Crowd: The New Zealand
Response to Equity Crowd Funding, 21 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 46, 52 (2015) (noting New
Zealand’s decision to not impose an investor cap as compared to other countries).
339. See Brian Korn, SEC Proposes Crowdfunding Rules, FORBES (Oct. 23,
2013, 2:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/10/23/secproposes-crowdfunding-rules/#637b9f77f6bd (last visited Jan. 24, 2018) (“The
high expenses compared to the low maximum amounts that can be raised by a
company and invested by an individual make public equity crowdfunding one of
the costliest forms of (legal) capital raising.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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will not participate, even if they have good use for $100,000 and
cannot obtain the money elsewhere.
Because New Zealand was focused entirely on efficiency, it
comes as no surprise that New Zealand’s crowdfunding market is
much more successful in economic terms than the one in the
United States.340 But what about inclusivity? The American
system was supposed to achieve that policy goal as well,341 while
New Zealand had no intention of doing so.342 The SEC’s final
version of its crowdfunding regulations, although they allow
platforms to act as gatekeepers,343 still retain other legal rules
designed to create an inclusive market. The final regulations
sharply limit advertising344 and maintain the per-investor cap that
prevents cornerstone investors from playing a role.345 The
remainder of this Section examines the empirical evidence from
the first year of American crowdfunding to determine whether it
has met its policy goal of inclusivity for entrepreneurs.346 As will
be discussed, the evidence on this score is somewhat mixed.
340. See Lloyd Kavanagh, New Zealand: The Equity Crowdfunding
Revolution, MINTERELLISONRUDDWATTS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://minterellison.co.
nz/our-view/new-zealand-the-equity-crowdfunding-revolution (last visited Jan.
24, 2018) (providing data on the first three years of crowdfunding in New Zealand
compared to the first year in the United States and citing an earlier draft of the
present article) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
341. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the use of securities crowdfunding as a
means of promoting inclusive entrepreneurship).
342. See supra Part III.C (identifying efficiency as the singular goal of New
Zealand’s crowdfunding law).
343. See supra Part III.D (discussing the ways in which the SEC attempted
to balance the goals of inclusivity and efficiency in the finalized regulations).
344. See Max E. Isaacson, The So-Called Democratization of Capital Markets:
Why Title III of the JOBS Act Fails to Fulfill the Promise of Crowdfunding, 20
N.C. BANKING INST. 439, 459–61 (2016) (discussing the key advertising limitations
of the JOBS Act).
345. See id. at 454–55 (discussing the potential negative impacts of the
funding cap).
346. Some of the data in this Part is based on statistics from the first 7.5
months of crowdfunding in the United States, namely from May 16, 2016, through
the end of that calendar year. See VLADIMIR IVANOV & ANZHELA KNYAZEVA, U.S.
SECURITIES-BASED CROWDFUNDING UNDER TITLE III OF THE JOBS ACT 1 (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/RegCF_WhitePaper.pdf
(setting forth evidence on initial crowdfunding activity in the period immediately
after the new regulations became effective); Sherwood Neiss, Here’s How
Regulation Crowdfunding Performed in 2016, VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 11, 2017, 5:05
PM),
https://venturebeat.com/2017/01/11/heres-how-regulation-crowdfunding-
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Like in New Zealand, crowdfunding platforms in the United
States may screen, curate and otherwise exclude companies based
on the platform’s subjective view of the merits of the investment.347
To get listed on a crowdfunding site in the United States,
entrepreneurs must first prove their worth to the gatekeeper (the
platform) who has a financial incentive to only open the gate for
the most promising companies.348 Even so, American crowdfunding
has become a fairly inclusive market from the standpoint of
entrepreneurs. Despite the ability of American crowdfunding
platforms to act as gatekeepers, there is substantial evidence to
indicate that platforms are relatively liberal in deciding whom to
present to the crowd.
In particular, very young startup companies without a track
record, without a crowd of pre-existing investors or customers, and
even without any assets, are in fact given a chance to pitch to the
crowd.349 The typical crowdfunding company in the United States
is so young as to be brand new. About 40% are less than one year
old,350 and 20% are less than three months old. The median age of
a crowdfunding company in the United States is just eighteen
months, and the average age is two years.351 In New Zealand, by
contrast, the average crowdfunding issuer is eight years old.352
Consistent with the goal of inclusivity, American crowdfunding
platforms are much more welcoming to brand-new, untested
startups, whereas New Zealand gatekeepers are more likely to list
established companies.

performed-in-2016/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing data concerning the
immediate impact of the JOBS Act crowdfunding regulations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review) .
347. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1496–99 (discussing the importance of
allowing crowdfunding platforms to regulate fundraising activities).
348. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1) (2017) (granting discretion to funding
portals to determine which issuers to include on their platforms).
349. See IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 13 (“[T]he typical
[crowdfunding] issuer is a small, young startup.”).
350. CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, supra note 256 (focusing on
Chart 11, which provides the total amount of committed capital to all campaigns
raising funds under Regulation Crowdfunding since May 16, 2016).
351. See IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 13–14 (noting that these ages
are based “on the initial filing relative to the date of incorporation”).
352. Id.
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In the same vein, the median crowdfunding company in the
United States had just three employees and $43,000 in assets, and
one-quarter of issuers had no assets at all.353 The majority (60%)
of American companies had no revenue, and almost all (91%) were
not profitable, when they undertook a crowdfunding campaign.354
Most successful crowdfunding campaigns in the United States
raised less than $200,000, with dozens raising under $100,000.355
The median amount raised was about $170,000.356 These numbers
indicate that American crowdfunding has attracted tiny startups
of the sort that are not generally listed on New Zealand
crowdfunding platforms, but which are given their chance in the
inclusive American system.
In addition, only about 10% of American crowdfunding
companies have previous investors, such as VCs or angel
investors.357 For the other 90% of issuers, “crowdfunding [is] their
initial foray into capital raising through a securities offering.”358
Recall that in New Zealand, platforms tend to prefer companies
that already have a pre-existing investor base.359 This is another
indicator that crowdfunding in the United States is achieving its
goal of including all entrepreneurs, even those “out of the loop.”
One final indicator of the inclusive nature of American
crowdfunding is the fact that crowdfunding campaigns in the
United States have a much lower success rate than in New
Zealand. Recall that New Zealand platforms generally try to only
353. See id. (noting that the average issuer had five employees and held
approximately $327,000 in assets).
354. See id. at 14 (“The median offering involved an issuer with 3 employees
and approximately $43,000 in assets . . . .”).
355. See 183 Reg CF Companies Have Hit Their Funding Target, WEFUNDER,
https://wefunder.com/stats/all (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (providing data on
company funding targets as of May 16, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 19 (describing
the characteristics of issuers that reported success and those that did not report
success).
356. See IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 1 (“[T]he median (average)
amount raised was approximately $171,000 ($303,000).”).
357. Id. at 15.
358. See id. at 15 (highlighting evidence that “some issuers had previously or
subsequently conducted an offering under Regulation D or Regulation A”).
359. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the ways in which New Zealand’s
crowdfunding laws promote efficiency by favoring established companies, while
marginalizing those without a pre-existing base of supporters).
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list companies that they expect to succeed in reaching their
financial target, leading to a success rate of about 80%.360
American crowdfunding campaigns, by contrast, succeed about
50% of the time.361 This statistical disparity was previously used
to show that New Zealand has a more efficient crowdfunding
market than does the United States (which it does).362 But it also
shows that American crowdfunding platforms are relatively liberal
and inclusive when deciding which companies to list on their sites.
Based on all of these statistics, the SEC has concluded that
American crowdfunding is fulfilling its inclusive goal of “providing
a new source of capital for entrepreneurial and small businesses
that may not otherwise have had access to capital.”363 Even so,
other evidence from the first year of American crowdfunding
indicate that the system may not be quite as inclusive as was
originally hoped.364
In terms of geography, there are certain, well-known hubs of
venture capital and angel investment, led by Silicon Valley in
California, as well as New York City, Boston, and Austin, Texas.365
The traditional way for an entrepreneur to access those pools of
capital was to physically travel or relocate to one of those places.366
360. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the gatekeeping role that New Zealand
crowdfunding platforms play in excluding companies that are unlikely to
succeed).
361. See supra notes 246–259 and accompanying text (discussing the
differences in the first-year success rates of equity crowdfunding between New
Zealand and the United States).
362. See supra Part IV.A.1 (explaining the methods used by New Zealand
crowdfunding platforms in their gatekeeping role to promote selectivity and
efficiency).
363. IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 16.
364. See supra notes 121–131 and accompanying text (discussing the policy
rationales behind the United States’ goal of inclusivity in crowdfunding
regulations).
365. See Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, supra note 123, at 286 (noting that
most venture capital firms tend to be concentrated in metropolitan locales, and
angel investors are generally found in “urban oases among rural regions).
366. See id. at 284
The upshot is that an entrepreneur with big dreams is still given the
same advice today that Horace Greely is said to have offered in the late
1800s: “Go west, young man, go west!” The conventional thinking is
that the ambitious among us must physically relocate from one part of
the country to another in order to find early-stage business financing.
Even for rural entrepreneurs that would prefer to remain in, say, Iowa,
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American crowdfunding under the JOBS Act was a way “to bring
venture capital to rural areas. By allowing rural entrepreneurs to
connect with and obtain financing from angel investors on the
Internet, crowdfunding frees them from the geographic constraint
that has long hindered entrepreneurship in rural areas.”367
In practice, as crowdfunding has developed, this
transcendence of geography occurred, but only to a modest extent.
As might have been expected, the geographic distribution of
crowdfunding issuers is dominated by California, with about
one-third of all crowdfunding offerings coming from issuers based
in that state.368 New York, Texas, and Florida all have significant
numbers of crowdfunding offerings, but they each account for only
about one-fifth the number of issuers as California.369 This comes
as no surprise, as those four boast the largest populations of all the
states.370 When it comes to successful fundraising totals, California
also leads the pack, with more than triple its closest competitor,
Texas, and more than five times the state in third place,
Massachusetts.371
At first blush, crowdfunding appears to have replicated the
existing geographic centers of venture finance in Silicon Valley,
Austin and Boston. Furthermore, at least fourteen states have not
had a single local company even attempt to raise money in this
way.372 And this group of states—Iowa, the Dakotas, West Virginia
rather than move to California, the siren song of wealthy and
experienced angel investors is near impossible to resist. You can’t keep
the kid on the farm, as they say.
367. Id. at 292–93.
368. See IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 18 (noting that California
also led in the target amount sought, the number of offerings reported complete,
and the amount reported raised).
369. See id. at 18 (noting that New York had the second most offerings, with
9% of the total).
370. See Idaho is Nation’s Fastest-Growing State, Census Bureau Reports,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2017/estimates-idaho.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (finding that
California is the largest state by population with an estimated 39,536,653
residents, followed by Texas (28,304,596), Florida (20,984,400), and New York
(19,849,399)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
371. See CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, supra note 256 (focusing on
Chart 9).
372. See id. (focusing on Chart 8, which shows zero offerings from
Washington, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas,
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and others—is closely correlated with the rural areas who were
supposed to benefit from crowdfunding’s ability to overcome
geography.373
On the other hand, a solid majority of the states have seen
their companies launch crowdfunding campaigns, and this
includes many states that are largely off the radar of traditional
VCs and angel investors, such as Idaho, New Mexico and South
Carolina.374 To cherry-pick one example, Alabama-based
companies raised nearly as much as Colorado-based companies in
the first year of crowdfunding.375 In the end, although it obviously
has not transformed Bismarck into Boston, or Pine Bluff into Palo
Alto, crowdfunding has in fact achieved some real amount of
geographic inclusivity.
Beyond geography, crowdfunding also shows modest success
when it comes to demographic inclusivity. It has been well
documented that women and minorities have very little success in
attracting traditional methods of startup finance, namely venture
capital and angel investment.376 To offer just one statistic, only 8%
of companies that receive venture capital investment have female
founders.377 Crowdfunding was supposed to help ameliorate this
disparity by allowing all entrepreneurs, of every demographic
stripe, to pitch their idea to the crowd for funding.378
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Iowa, Arkansas, Wisconsin, Kentucky, West Virginia, and
Virginia).
373. See Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, supra note 123, at 292–93
(discussing the increased access to investors that securities crowdfunding has
brought to rural entrepreneurs).
374. See CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, supra note 256 (focusing on
Chart 8).
375. See id. (finding that Colorado-based companies raised $933,000 and
Alabama-based companies raised $825,000).
376. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 622–23 (noting the
“severe lack of access to startup financing” for women and racial minorities).
377. See Habib Jamal, Crowdfunding’s Potential for Minority and Women
Owned Enterprises, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS (July 28, 2014),
https://www.scribd.com/document/235308665/Crowdfunding-s-Potential-forMinority-and-Women-Owned-Enterprises (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that
“41% of businesses are women owned, but only 8% of ventures that are backed by
professional investors are founded by women”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
378. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 623 (“Crowdfunding
offers a new and inclusive way to bring needed financing to startups all across
America, from coast to coast, in rural areas and urban, to entrepreneurs rich and
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To some extent, this has happened. Companies with at least
one female founder represented about 20% of American
crowdfunding campaigns, and nearly 90% of companies founded by
women-only teams were successfully funded.379 Although the
absolute numbers for this latter statistic were quite small (seven
of eight), these statistics are encouraging.380 At the same time,
further statistical analysis would be needed to fully answer
whether crowdfunding is succeeding in its goal of providing a
demographically inclusive form of entrepreneurial finance.381 For
now, it appears that crowdfunding has been at least somewhat
successful in giving entrepreneurs of every demographic group a
fair chance to obtain financing.382
Overall, American crowdfunding has achieved substantial
success in creating an inclusive environment for entrepreneurs,
especially as compared to New Zealand. Brand-new companies
with nothing but an idea are given a chance to try to convince the
crowd to fund their business, and the market is also fairly inclusive
in terms of geography and demography.

poor, young and old, men and women of every race, ethnicity, and religion.”);
Jamal, supra note 377 (providing evidence on the reality of crowdfund investing
for women and minorities).
379. See Women and Minorities in Regulation Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND
CAP. ADVISORS (May 4, 2017), http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/womenminorities-regulation-crowdfunding/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that
companies with only male founders had a 41% success rate) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
380. See id. (providing data showing that 68 out of 165 companies founded by
white men were successful).
381. Cf. John R. Becker-Blease & Jeffrey E. Sohl, Do Women-Owned
Businesses Have Equal Access to Angel Capital?, 22 J. BUS. VENTURING 503, 504
(2007) (reporting on survey finding that only 9% of proposals presented to angel
investors came from women entrepreneurs).
382. One demographic group that should, in theory, benefit by an inclusive
system of crowdfunding is youthful entrepreneurs. See Schwartz, Teenage
Crowdfunding, supra note 125, at 516 (“Teenagers, being experts at Facebook,
Snapchat, Twitter, Instagram and such, are very well positioned to take
advantage of the online securities exemption that the [JOBS] Act
creates. . . . [S]ecurities crowdfunding may well develop into an important
funding source for financing teenage startup companies . . . .”). This aspect of
demographic inclusivity is not addressed because the author is unaware of any
statistics or data showing the extent to which young entrepreneurs have sought
to finance their companies via crowdfunding.
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V. Inclusive Crowdfunding is a Luxury

The divergent laws, regulations, policy goals and practical
results of crowdfunding in the United States and New Zealand
teach that there is a trade-off between inclusivity and efficiency.383
The American system is more inclusive, but less efficient; the New
Zealand system is more efficient, but less inclusive. This is an
important lesson, especially for the many countries around the
world presently in the process of drafting and implementing their
own crowdfunding laws, such as Australia, which enacted its law
in March 2017, which is scheduled to go into effect in September
2017.384 It is also highly relevant to those countries, including the
United States, that are considering whether and how to reform the
crowdfunding laws they currently have in place.385
The evidence and analysis discussed in this Article indicate
that the original concept for securities crowdfunding, where every
entrepreneur would get the chance to pitch her idea to the crowd,
is probably too inefficient to function.386 The gatekeeper model,
which was adopted from the outset in New Zealand and belatedly
in the United States, seems clearly to be more efficient for all
participants in the market, both in theory and in practice.387 But it
is also exclusive by its nature because it relies on intermediaries
to curate their listings and exclude many companies who request
access to the crowd.
The upshot is that policymakers around the world need to
think carefully about which policy goal they are trying to achieve—
inclusivity or efficiency—and design their crowdfunding market
accordingly. It may be possible to achieve both goals, but the
383. See supra notes 337–364 and accompanying text (comparing New
Zealand’s focus on efficiency with the United States’ concern for inclusivity in
crowdfunding policies).
384. See, e.g., Corporations Amendment (Crowd-Sourced Funding) Act 2017
(Cth) (Austl.) (codifying Australian crowdfunding law, enacted on March 28,
2017).
385. See, e.g., Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 476–479
(2017) (proposing legislation altering current crowdfunding laws).
386. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1506 (“True crowd-based investing was
always a fantasy.”).
387. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the steps New Zealand has taken to
ensure efficiency in their crowdfunding market); see also Ibrahim, supra note 130,
at 1499 (calling for even “more curation” in crowdfunding (emphasis in original)).
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experience in the United States is not encouraging on that front.388
In going for both at the same time, the American system ended up
being only weakly inclusive, and not very efficient.389 It is possible
that a different set of laws could have worked better to promote
both inclusivity and efficiency at the same time, but the most
immediate lesson seems to be that a crowdfunding market will
work best if a clear choice between one and the other is made.
So which to choose? It seems that the most important
consideration for policymakers deciding whether to enact an
efficient crowdfunding regime, or an inclusive one, is whether their
jurisdiction already has an effective source of early stage venture
capital.390 If a country has a deep and well-functioning set of VC
funds and angel investors that are available to finance promising
startup companies, then it can afford to design a relatively
inefficient crowdfunding market as an inclusive complement to
that source of capital. On the other hand, if a country lacks VC
funds and angel investors, and therefore needs a new and
significant source of early stage capital, it should try to create an
efficient system for crowdfunding; inclusivity is a luxury it cannot
afford.
This suggested decision-making process is consistent with
what we have seen happening over the past few years around the
world. Countries with shallow pools of VC and angel investment
have tried to enact efficient crowdfunding regimes that would
serve as a substitute source of capital for its startup companies.
And countries with deep pools of VC and angel investment have
adopted inclusive and inefficient crowdfunding laws—or have not
even adopted a crowdfunding law at all.391
388. See supra notes 349–352 and accompanying text (discussing the
crowdfunding considerations that allow for an inclusive market).
389. See supra Part II.D (reviewing the regulatory history of crowdfunding in
the United States and the tension between efficiency and inclusivity).
390. See supra notes 225–234 and accompanying text (noting the difference
in the levels of pre-existing early stage venture capital between the United States
and New Zealand).
391. See generally AYAL SHENHAV & GAL HOFFMAN, EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING
NETWORK, REVIEW OF CROWDFUNDING REGULATION: INTERPRETATIONS OF EXISTING
REGULATION CONCERNING CROWDFUNDING IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND ISRAEL
(2014), http://eurocrowd.winball2.de/wp-content/blogs.dir/sites/85/2014/12/ECNReview-of-Crowdfunding-Regulation-2014.pdf (providing an overview of the
crowdfunding market and regulations in twenty-nine countries across Europe
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Two countries stand out as having far and away the deepest
pools of entrepreneurial capital (measured by percentage of
venture capital as a percentage of GDP): Israel and the United
States.392 These countries do not ‘need’ crowdfunding to fund their
promising startup companies.393 They can afford to enact a
crowdfunding law that is designed to be inclusive, even at the
expense of efficiency, or even decline to pass a crowdfunding law
in the first place. Thus the United States, as discussed above,
adopted an inclusive crowdfunding regime that suffers from
inefficiency, and Israel has yet to enact any sort of crowdfunding
law at all.394 Going forward, the United States should consider
amending the JOBS Act to achieve greater inclusivity among
crowdfunding entrepreneurs, even at the cost of efficiency. We can
afford it.
Other countries have few VCs and angels and thus really need
some new and efficient means of channeling capital to promising
early stage startup companies. Examples of these sorts of countries
are Italy and New Zealand. Scaled for the size of its economy,
Italy’s venture capital activity amounts to less than 1% of the
United States, the lowest in Western Europe; the relevant
percentage for New Zealand is 8%.395 It should come as no surprise
that these countries would be quick to enact securities
crowdfunding laws. The New Zealand experience was discussed in
and North America, as well as Israel).
392. See Entrepenuership at a Glance 2016: Venture Capital Investments as a
Percentage of GDP: Percentage, 2015, or Latest Available Year, OECDILIBRARY
(2016), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/entrepreneurship-ata-glance-2016/venture-capital-investments-as-a-percentage-ofgdp_entrepreneur_aag-2016-graph119-en (last updated Sept. 28, 2016) (last
visited Jan. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Venture Capital] (providing data on venture
capital investments as a percentage of gross domestic product for thirty-two
countries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
393. See id. (noting the significant drop off in late stage venture funding
between the United States and Israel and the rest of the surveyed countries).
394. See SHENHAV & HOFFMAN, supra note 391, at 130 (discussing proposed
crowdfunding legislation in Israel). Reports indicate that the Israeli government
is in the process of enacting regulations to cover equity crowdfunding. See Is
Equity Crowdfunding right for you, VCFORU, https://www.vcforu.com/equitycrowdfunding (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting that on “March 20, 2017 the
Israeli Government passed a new regulation on equity crowdfunding”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
395. Venture Capital, supra note 392.
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detail above, and a similar story unfolded in Italy.396
Italy was the first in the world to enact a securities
crowdfunding law, outpacing even New Zealand.397 Italy’s
legislation was passed in 2012 and went into effect in 2013, and it
had several features consistent with a policy goal of creating an
efficient source of entrepreneurial capital, including a legal
requirement that issuers be “innovative start-up” companies, and
that every issuance be led by a professional cornerstone investor.398
Furthermore, when Italy’s crowdfunding law did not lead to as
much investment as the government had hoped, it went back to
the drawing board and issued a revised law in 2016.399 Italy is
understandably trying to make its crowdfunding system more
efficient, because the country desperately needs it to fill in for the
absence of VC and angel investors.
In sum, the key question for policymakers around the world
deciding on a new or revised crowdfunding law is whether their
country needs equity crowdfunding as a substitute for VC and
angel investment, or if it can afford to have crowdfunding serve as
a complement to existing VC and angel financing. Countries that
already possess sufficient pools of entrepreneurial capital can
afford to undermine the efficiency of their crowdfunding regime by
trying to make it inclusive. But countries that lack satisfactory
levels of startup finance cannot afford that luxury; they need to
follow New Zealand’s lead and focus exclusively on efficiency, at
the cost of inclusivity.

396. See supra Part III.B (discussing New Zealand’s reaction to the United
States JOBS Act through crowdfunding regulations).
397. See Blair Bowman, A Comparative Analysis of Crowdfunding Regulation
in the United States and Italy, 33 WIS. INT’L L. J. 318, 332 (2015) (reporting that
Italy enacted the “world’s first equity crowdfunding law, the Decreto Crescita
Bis,” in 2012).
398. See id. at 339–41 (discussing the bars to participation in equity
crowdfunding in Italy).
399. See Italy Opens Up Equity Crowdfunding to All Kinds of SMEs,
EUROPEAN
CROWDFUNDING
NETWORK
(Dec.
13,
2016),
http://eurocrowd.org/2016/12/13/italy-opens-equity-crowdfunding-kind-smes/
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (noting that the new Italian law allows “any SME to
raise funds via equity crowdfunding”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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VI. Conclusion

This Article provided a theoretical and empirical study of
securities crowdfunding in the United States and New Zealand. It
analyzed the origins, the legislation, and the regulation of
crowdfunding in the two jurisdictions,400 and provided data on the
first year of practical experience in each country.401 To a significant
degree, the policy goals in each country have been achieved.402
The law in the United States was designed to create a market
that is both inclusive and efficient, and in practice it has achieved
a little of each.403 American crowdfunding welcomes all types of
investors and has created a space for a broad swath of
entrepreneurs to pitch their ideas to the crowd.404 At the same
time, the market has not been a huge financial impact, having
raised just $35 million across all companies in its first year.405
The law in New Zealand was designed for efficiency only and
it has achieved its goal in practice.406 Crowdfunding companies in
New Zealand have conducted thirteen times as many campaigns
and raised thirty times as much capital than their counterparts in
the United States, with a much higher success rate.407 Unlike in
the United States, the New Zealand market is not particularly
400. See supra Part II.A–B (describing the foundations and regulations of
crowdfunding regulation in the United States); supra Part III.A–B (describing
New Zealand’s crowdfunding regulations and comparing them to those in the
United States).
401. See supra Part IV (comparing the results of the first year of crowdfunding
regulations in the United States and New Zealand).
402. See supra Part II.C (discussing the United States’ policy goals in
crowdfunding regulation); supra Part III.C (describing New Zealand’s policy goals
and the results of crowdfunding regulation).
403. See supra Part II.C (describing the steps taken by the United States to
ensure a crowdfunding market that is both efficient and inclusive).
404. See supra notes 376–382 (discussing the impact of equity crowdfunding
regulations on female and minority entrepreneurs).
405. See The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, WEFUNDER,
https://wefunder.com/stats (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (noting that as of January
25, 2018 investors had funded $56,106,031) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
406. See supra Part III.C (discussing New Zealand’s policy goals of efficiency
in crowdfunding regulations).
407. See supra notes 246–259 (comparing the first-year success rates of
crowdfunding in New Zealand and the United States).
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inclusive, especially of entrepreneurs, but then it was never
designed to be.408
The broader lesson for countries around the world in the
process of designing or reforming their own crowdfunding laws is
that they should decide whether they are trying to create an
inclusive system, an efficient system, or if they are trying to
balance the two. Once they settle upon their policy goals, they can
craft their laws accordingly, using New Zealand or the United
States as a model. Countries that lack a deep pool of
entrepreneurial finance (like New Zealand) should probably focus
on efficiency, while countries that already have a mature market
for VC and angel investment (like the United States) can afford to
try for both goals at once.

408.
See generally Schwartz, Crowdfunding Social Enterprise, supra note 59
(reporting that approximately one-third of the companies that attempt to (and
succeed in) raise money via equity crowdfunding in New Zealand can be classified
as “social enterprises”).

